Opinion Succeeding Chávez

Now,Capriles has challenged the result in the nation’s Supreme Court. Whatever the outcome,it is unlikely to resolve tensions. Even if the court reaffirms Maduro’s victory,which Capriles has said is likely, and Capriles accepts the result,years of Chavista reconstruction of the institutions of politics have undermined their credibility. A narrow victory is unlikely to convince opponents of the legitimacy of Maduro’s presidency. More,Maduro’s failure to win convincingly,despite Chávez’ strong endorsement,is unlikely to persuade his fellow Chavistas that he is the right man to carry the Chávez legacy forward. Signs of criticism may already be appearing from among Maduro’s likely rivals within the party,most notably Diosdado Cabello,president of the National Assembly.

Political weakness is a particular danger,given Venezuela’s serious economic problems. To be fair,Chávez inherited a country already facing serious challenges. Nevertheless,he leaves behind an economy much worse. Chávez’s supporters point to his many social “missions” and policy of “endogenous development.” But the reality is that his economic and social programmes differed little from earlier periods of unsustainable,unproductive and clientelistic spending based on booming oil revenues. Over the 2000s,Venezuela’s economy and society have seen terrible decay. The country suffers from crippling infrastructure problems and inadequate public transportation. Despite efforts,official rates of inflation have risen over the past years to average well over 20 per cent. Crime has sky-rocketed,with Caracas recording 200 homicides per 100,000 people — almost 10 times the regional average.

Chávez’s development and social policy programme rested on a highly discretionary,centralised and unaccountable control of oil revenues. For a number of years,high prices guaranteed him room to finance his many spending programmes. A central problem for Maduro,however,is that Venezuela’seconomy has become even more oil-dependent economy,even as oil has become less reliable as a cash machine. Oil exports account for roughly 95 per cent of Venezuela’s export revenues and 45 per cent of the country’s budget revenues. But Chávez’s re-nationalisation of the oil industry and political interference in the management of the national oil company,PDVSA,has discouraged investment,led to dwindling production and undermined the country’s capacity to refine its own oil. Dwindling investment is a particular problem. Oil production since 1999 has averaged a decline of roughly 2.5 per cent each year,with production in 2012 almost a million barrels per day less than in 1998. Exports hit a peak in 2005,but have since fallen,reaching their lowest level with the US in 18 years by March 2013. With the US,Venezuela’s most important export market,moving towards reliance on domestic sources of energy,Venezuela’s prospects appear even graver.

Maduro takes office facing an angry opposition with a renewed sense that Chavismo can be defeated,an insecure governing party that is fractious and has significant rivals for leadership,and an economy with massive challenges. Chávez maintained movement unity,deflected concerns about the economy,and rendered the opposition ineffe-ctive through a soft authoritarianism and a magnetic personality that Maduro lacks. What he does have is a large set of laws passed under Chávez that permits this soft authoritarianism and indeed opens the door to harder versions of it. These include laws that can stifle and/ or intimidate freedom of speech and political opposition. Laws and legal precedents for centralising power and bypassing the legislature and sub-national electoral bodies. The risk to Venezuela is that hard economic problems and political fractiousness and polarisation may lead Maduro to rely on increasingly undemocratic means. Unfortunately,that is unlikely to solve the country’s economic problems or heal political divisions.

The writer is co-director,Institute for International Development,King’s College London,UK