Opinion Prithviraj Chavan writes: We saw the IndiGO meltdown. Now let’s see the aviation sector’s restructuring
The government can consider breaking up IndiGo into two completely independent airlines as was done in the US under the Sherman and Clayton Anti-Trust Acts
A formal inquiry by the DGCA should be conducted with findings to be submitted within 15 days. 
The Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) first proposed the new FDTL (Flight Duty Time Limitations) in January 2024 to give adequate rest to pilots in the interest of passenger safety. IndiGo ignored the notification and, using political clout, took no action to recruit or train new pilots or even adjust the schedules to comply with the new safety requirements. Pilot complaints were ignored, allegations of monopoly abuse emerged. Pilots filed cases in courts. However, the regulator continued to relax regulations specifically for IndiGo. On December 5, over 1,000 IndiGo flights had to be cancelled. Thousands of passengers were stranded across India. After several postponements to favour IndiGo, under court orders, the DGCA finally decided to implement the new FDTL rules from July 1 and November 1, two years after they were first proposed.
Minister Ram Mohan Naidu said India would require about 30,000 new pilots over the next 15 years. On November 25, Adani Defence Systems and Prime Aero Services acquired a majority stake in the Flight Simulation Technique Centre (FSTC), giving the Adani Group significant control over India’s pilot-training ecosystem. Five days later, on December 1, we witnessed the IndiGo meltdown. Is there a connection?
Today IndiGo controls 65 per cent of the Indian aviation market, while the Tatas (Air India) have less than 30 per cent market share. In 2004, there were 4 crore annual passengers and eight airlines. In 2025, passengers rose to 40 crore, with only two major airlines. This represents a classic case of regulatory capture where the regulator ensures private profit instead of public interest.
What is the experience in other developed markets? We do not have to look far. The recent Southwest Airlines crisis in the US is a good case study. It began around December 21, 2022, when a severe winter storm hit large parts of western and central US. In the next few days, between December 26 to 28, over 5,500 Southwest flights were cancelled. In all, Southwest ended up cancelling over 16,000 flights, the largest such disruption in US aviation history. Nearly 2 million passengers were stranded. While the winter storm triggered the initial disruption, deeper structural and operational weaknesses made it into a full-blown meltdown.
Southwest used an old, inflexible system for rostering and managing flights. It could not handle cascading disruptions. Once the system got out of sync, the manual processes that took over could not cope. Internal warnings by the pilots’ union had emphasised that the systems were “outdated” and vulnerable. But the warnings were ignored. The crisis triggered investigations by a Senate Committee. After a year of investigation, in December 2023, the US Department of Transportation (DOT) fined Southwest $140 million, the largest consumer-protection penalty ever levied on a US airline. In addition to the fine, Southwest had to reimburse over $600 million. The airline estimated total losses, both direct and indirect, to be nearly $1 billion. Southwest re-evaluated its systems and committed to major resilience-focused upgrades. By early 2025, it had regained its strong on-time performance, and claimed a return to reliable service. The 2022 Southwest Airlines meltdown remains a classic example of how fragile operational systems turned an ordinary weather event into a nationwide catastrophe.
So what should be done about the IndiGo meltdown?
Remove the Civil Aviation Minister (Naidu) for permitting delay in the implementation of safety rules, which compromised passenger safety. Also, replace the Secretary, Civil Aviation. They are accountable and must accept responsibility.
Remove the Director General, Civil Aviation, and top leadership of the DGCA.
Terminate Pieter Elbers, CEO of IndiGo, who is directly responsible for operational failure. It is strange that everyone connected with IndiGo has apologised except the promoter, Rahul Bhatia.
A formal inquiry by the DGCA should be conducted with findings to be submitted within 15 days.
Impose financial penalties on IndiGo to create a compensation fund for passengers affected by cancellations. Section 27 of the Competition Act empowers the government to impose penalties of up to 10 per cent of the company’s average turnover over the last three years. This is one of the strongest tools available to the government to prevent monopoly abuse in India.
Initiate suo motu action to impose penalties under Section 18(2) of the Consumer Protection Act.
Redistribute some of IndiGo’s slots to other airlines.
Institute a Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) to specifically look into the possible nexus of IndiGo’s (InterGlobe Aviation) political donation of Rs 58 crore by electoral bonds to political parties, mainly the BJP. Did these donations enable IndiGo to ignore the DGCA’s FDTL safety norms, postpone hiring new pilots to maximise profits, and risk passenger safety?
On August 31, 2022, the then Civil Aviation Minister, Jyotiraditya Scindia, removed the fare cap, thereby allowing airlines to charge exorbitant fares. After the Odisha train accident, airlines reportedly charged as much as Rs 1,00,000 for a Chennai-Bhubaneswar ticket. Following the IndiGo meltdown, the government reimposed the fare cap on December 5. Many developing countries cap airfares. However, the Civil Aviation Minister informed Parliament last week that a permanent cap on airfares was not feasible. One cannot accept that proposition. In a monopoly situation, there must be a fare cap or a price band. Why did the government remove the fare cap and allow the airlines to fleece the passengers? This should be investigated by the JPC.
Regulation of the Indian aviation sector needs to be completely restructured. This should be done by scrapping the current DGCA. It was constituted by an executive order under the Aircraft Act, 1934. A new autonomous Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) under an Act of Parliament, similar to the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), is required. This was proposed by the Manmohan Singh government in December 2012.
Section 28 of the Competition Act empowers the government to impose a structural remedy to break up a monopoly. The government can consider breaking up IndiGo into two completely independent airlines as was done in the US under the Sherman and Clayton Anti-Trust Acts. There would then be three equal-sized companies, each with a market share of 33 per cent. This would act as a warning to other emerging monopolies.
The writer was a Union minister and chief minister of Maharashtra
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