Opinion Past choppy waters

But the recent eruption of high-pitched territorial disputes between China and Japan over the Diaoyu Islands (or Senkaku,as they are called in Japan) shows that China’s vaunted pragmatism goes only so far. This dispute is by no means new. Originally owned by the Chinese Qing dynasty but ceded to Japan after the first Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95,these islands – uninhabited barren rocks in the East China Sea — have a convoluted history. During the Second World War,the Allies declared that all “territories stolen by the Japanese empire” would be reverted to their rightful owners. This would include the return of these islands to China. Unfortunately,China’s civil war of 1946-49 resulted in the victory of the Chinese communists,and the United States,which had effective control of these islands,had no desire to carry out the commitment made by the Allies. So when the Americans returned the sovereignty of Okinawa to Japan in 1972,Washington decided to give Japan “administrative authority” (but not ownership) over these islands. However,Japan has since claimed its sovereignty over these islands and declared their status is non-disputable and non-negotiable.

Of course,neither Beijing nor Taipei could accept this outcome,and even though Beijing and Taipei have sovereignty disputes of their own,they are unified on the Diaoyu/ Senkaku dispute. For the past 40 years,Beijing and Tokyo have adopted a pragmatic policy. While neither side has backed down from its sovereignty claims,they observed a modus vivendi: Chinese fishing boats would be allowed to operate within 200 miles of the islands,but no Chinese ships would be allowed to enter the 12-mile territorial waters off the islands to contest their sovereignty.

But all this changed two years ago,when the drunken captain of a Chinese fishing trawler piloted his vessel into the territorial waters of the Diaoyu/Senkaku and rammed into a Japanese coast guard ship. The Japanese authorities detained him and planned to try him,an act that would assert Japan’s sovereignty claims in a more formal legal manner. An outraged Beijing reacted ferociously,cutting off high-level diplomatic contacts,cancelling cultural exchanges,and suspending exports of rare-earth minerals to Japan (a critical component for Japan’s hi-tech industries). Tokyo had to back down and release the captain,but this incident marked the most serious setback for Sino-Japanese relations since anti-Japanese demonstrations swept China in 2005.

For a while,it seemed that common sense prevailed in Beijing and Tokyo again,as both sides cooled their tempers and returned to the status quo ante. Unfortunately,a few months ago,the nationalist governor of Tokyo,Shintaro Ishihara,declared that he would raise money to buy the three islands currently owned by private Japanese citizens. To forestall a crisis that could erupt should Ishihara’s ploy succeed,the Japanese government decided to purchase the islands itself. Little did Japanese leaders know that such an act,by dint of its symbolism of sovereignty,would incense the Chinese and create a diplomatic crisis. The situation was exacerbated by Japan’s unwillingness to consult with Beijing on the official purchase since its long-standing position is that Japan’s sovereignty over the islands is non-disputable and non-negotiable.

The Chinese reaction,sadly but predictably,was fast and furious. Violent anti-Japanese demonstrations erupted in dozens of Chinese cities. Mobs attacked Japanese diplomatic missions. Japanese cars,owned by Chinese citizens,were overturned and burned. Japanese firms had to close for days to protect the safety of their employees. A spontaneous movement to boycott Japanese goods has begun. Sales of Japanese cars have plunged. To contest Japan’s sovereignty claims,China dispatched several official,albeit unarmed,marine surveillance ships into the territorial waters of the disputed islands,in an unprecedented act to underscore its resolve to defend its claims.

In the rapid escalation of tensions,it appeared that China and Japan could get into a military confrontation over these islands and risk destroying their interdependent economic relations. In 2011 bilateral trade was $345 billion. While China is Japan’s largest trading partner,it also relies heavily on Japanese investments and firms to keep its export machine humming. A downturn in relations will definitely hurt their commercial interests.

After losing their cool over the dispute,it now seems that pragmatism has returned to both Tokyo and Beijing. Japan has dispatched its deputy foreign minister to Beijing to discuss a graceful way to resolve the crisis. In Beijing,China does not want to appear soft. Its senior officials,including the leader-in-waiting,Xi Jinping,have kept to their hardline rhetoric. China’s central bank governor,finance minister and senior executives of state-owned banks also boycotted the IMF-World Bank annual meeting in Tokyo this month,obviously at the direction of their government. But there are signs that the Chinese authorities are trying to de-escalate the crisis. They have put an end to anti-Japanese demonstrations and arrested rioters caught on video tape destroying property during the demonstrations. The only potential trigger for a dangerous confrontation is China’s decision to continue to send official unarmed marine surveillance ships into the territorial waters of the disputed islands to challenge Japanese claims to sovereignty. At the moment,Japan has wisely not responded,but Tokyo may want to get tough with China at some point in the future. Should that happen,an ugly confrontation possibly involving the use of violence could happen.

For longtime watchers of how Beijing handles foreign policy crises,the latest Sino-Japanese diplomatic confrontation followed a familiar pattern. Initially,political considerations (in this case,leadership transition and the need to pander to nationalist sentiments) motivated Chinese officials to opt for an uncompromising position and give a green light to nationalist elements to stage violent demonstrations. But as the crisis continued to escalate and the costs of further confrontations became prohibitive,pragmatism would return. Official positions are softened,mobs are reined in,and effective measures taken to de-escalate the tensions.

Such a pattern of crisis management shows the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese leadership. We must praise them for not losing their heads in a crisis. But we should also blame them for not responding to the onset of the crisis more effectively and pragmatically.

The writer is a professor of government and non-resident senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the US

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