Opinion P Chidambaram writes: War against a fused front
I feel it would have been more appropriate to convene a special session of Parliament and for the prime minister or defence minister to make a statement on Operation Sindoor, and invite a discussion. However, it was egregious behaviour on the part of bhakts to troll General Chauhan (as they trolled Foreign Secretary, Mr Vikram Misri)
General Chauhan could not have spoken without instructions from the highest levels of government. What he said was simple and straightforward: that the Indian military achieved its objectives but suffered losses. 
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I submitted my column by the deadline (‘That’s the way the cookie crumbles’, Indian Express, June 1, 2025) but was unlucky by 24 hours. The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Anil Chauhan, gave an interview on May 31, 2025 at Singapore to Bloomberg and Reuters. The timing, place and the choice of media were indeed surprising but not alarmingly wrong. The occasion was the Shangri-La Dialogue: it is a Track One inter-governmental security conference held annually in Singapore by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). Singapore is a friendly country.
The truth had to be told some day. I feel it would have been more appropriate to convene a special session of Parliament and for the prime minister or defence minister to make a statement on Operation Sindoor, and invite a discussion. However, it was egregious behaviour on the part of bhakts to troll General Chauhan (as they trolled Foreign Secretary, Mr Vikram Misri).
Gains & Losses
General Chauhan could not have spoken without instructions from the highest levels of government. What he said was simple and straightforward: that the Indian military achieved its objectives but suffered losses. He admitted that tactical mistakes were made on May 7; that the Armed Forces’ leaders had re-strategised; and India launched a fresh attack on the night of May 9-10 targeting Pakistan’s military airbases. The CDS did not quantify the losses, but independent experts and the international media have put the loss as five aircraft: 3 Rafale, 1 Sukhoi and 1 MIG.
The issue of ‘tactical mistakes’ and ‘losses’ require deeper and sober analysis by military experts, not uninformed noisy debates on television screens. From the information (some verified, some not) available in the public domain the following are clear:
- Indian aircraft and missiles had the first-mover advantage in the early hours of May 7 and destroyed (or severely damaged) nine infrastructure bases of terrorist groups in Pakistan.
- Pakistan retaliated on May 8 and sent drones to counter-attack targets in India. Pakistan also deployed guided missiles. Indian aircraft were lost on May 8. From CDS’s remarks subsequently (at Pune on June 4), it seems that Indian aircraft were lost over Indian airspace and the other aircraft were grounded on May 8 and 9.
- After re-strategizing, Indian aircraft, missiles and drones were deployed on May 9-10 (CDS said May 10). Indian aircraft seemed to have stayed within Indian airspace and fired missiles, including BrahMos missiles, and hit Pakistan’s 11 military air bases.
- The war stopped on May 10.
China’s Proxy War
The purpose of this article is not to play amateur military analyst. It is to make the point that India finds itself in a new situation. It is now fairly well-established that Chinese aircraft (J-10), Chinese missiles (PL-15) and Chinese air defence systems were in full play in Pakistan’s defence-offence strategy. The adversary was Pakistani pilots in Chinese aircraft, Pakistani fingers on the trigger of Chinese missiles, and Pakistani generals carrying out a strategic plan drawn by Chinese generals. Further, Chinese satellites and Chinese AI seem to have guided Pakistan. In short, China seemed to have used the opportunity to test its military hardware on the battlefield and fight a proxy war against India.
Which takes us to the next major issue. How relevant and efficacious is the three-point doctrine laid down by prime minister Narendra Modi in the radically altered situation? The doctrine posits that India will fight a war against Pakistan. No longer. It is now clear that if a war is thrust upon India, India will fight a war against Pakistan and China fused into one adversary. The Indian war preparedness based on a one-front war or a two-front war has been blown away: any future war will be a fused-front war.
Mr Modi’s first rule in his three-point doctrine is that every terrorist attack will get a befitting response. A cross-border stealth attack by the Indian Army (in response to Uri) or a solitary air strike by the Indian Air Force (in response to Pathankot) were no longer deterrent responses. Hence, the response to Pahalgam was a four-day war. If terrorist attacks do not cease, what next? A longer, escalated war? A war against the fused front?
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Foreign & Military Policies
India’s foreign policy under Mr Narendra Modi has proved to be woefully inadequate in the changed circumstances. Despite India’s opposition, on May 9, IMF approved USD 1 billion to Pakistan under Extended Fund Facility (EFF), bringing the total disbursements to USD 2.1 billion. On June 3, ADB approved a loan of USD 800 million to Pakistan. Recently, the World Bank decided to lend Pakistan USD 40 billion over a ten-year period. On these decisions, the U.S. and China were on the same side. The greatest irony is that Pakistan was elected Chairman of the UNSC Taliban Sanctions Committee and Vice Chairman of the UNSC Counter Terrorism Committee! (source: Mr Pawan Khera, Chairman, AICC Media & Publicity Department).
All these happened during and after Operation Sindoor and when our MPs’ delegations were briefing countries of the world. Every country condemned terrorism but, to the best of my information, no country condemned Pakistan.
As I wrote last week, it is time to go back to the drawing board to re-think India’s military’s strategy and foreign policy. With acute minds.
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