Opinion On China, let’s do a reality check

But peel back the rhetoric, and the hard facts show. What India has accepted are buffer zones — no-patrol areas carved into territory we once accessed freely. Indian patrols that for decades went up to our perceived LAC now stop short. Patrols that were once unilateral are now “coordinated” with Chinese consent, subject to advance notification. The status quo ante has not been restored.

Meanwhile, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has entrenched itself. It has built dual-use villages, heliports, all-weather roads, and hardened runways across the Tibetan plateau. Bases at Hotan and Ngari have expanded, cutting mobilisation times dramatically. This is not de-escalation. What we are witnessing is strategic shrinkage dressed up as stability.

The second plank of the reset is economics. Direct flights are resuming after five years. Indian tourist visas for Chinese nationals are being reissued. Beijing has lifted certain export restrictions on rare earths and fertilisers. Bilateral trade has climbed to a record $131.84 billion in FY 2024–25.

Yet, these developments only underline the asymmetry. India’s trade deficit with China has simultaneously ballooned to a record $99.2 billion. In critical sectors — pharmaceuticals, electronics, solar modules — Indian supply chains remain dangerously exposed. Nearly 70 per cent of bulk drug ingredients are still sourced from China. In advanced technologies like batteries and semiconductors, we continue to lean heavily on Beijing.

When China “eases curbs”, it is not making concessions. It is loosening valves it had itself tightened. The message is clear: Your dependencies are levers in our hands. Today they are open; tomorrow they can be closed. Indeed, new restrictions on speciality fertilisers are already in the pipeline for October.

The third argument for the reset is political symbolism. After a seven-year freeze, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping met in Tianjin and declared India and China to be “partners, not rivals”. They spoke of “mutual respect, trust and sensitivity”. The Russia-India-China trilateral format is being revived; BRICS and SCO meetings are framed as proof of renewed cooperation.

But slogans do not demilitarise runways. Even as leaders smiled for cameras, satellite imagery shows PLA bases in Tibet hardening further with fortified logistics hubs and fresh helipads. In the Indian Ocean, Chinese submarine forays continue. In Islamabad, Chinese arms deliveries deepen Pakistan’s military edge. At the UN, Beijing blocks or dilutes India’s initiatives on counter-terrorism.

For India, the danger is reputational: Our credibility with partners in Washington, Tokyo, Canberra, and Brussels rests on the assumption that we are the democratic counterweight to Beijing. By proclaiming partnership with China, we blur that premise, weaken allied trust, and dilute our bargaining power.

The defenders of a reset end with a modest claim: This is not capitulation, they say, but incremental confidence-building. Small steps today, trust tomorrow. But confidence-building is only real when it reduces the adversary’s capacity or intent to coerce. Here, neither has changed. PLA infrastructure has grown, not shrunk. Indian dependencies have widened, not narrowed. Chinese ties with Pakistan remain intimate, not frayed. Beijing’s Indo-Pacific ambitions remain expansionist, not restrained. What the reset delivers, in practice, is time for Beijing — to consolidate gains, harden infrastructure, and deepen our dependencies, while India relaxes into false calm.

Beyond the tactical flaws lies a deeper danger: National amnesia. By embracing the reset narrative, India risks erasing the memory of Galwan, where 20 of our soldiers died in 2020. Their sacrifice was not for buffer zones and slogans. It was for sovereignty.

History shows that aggression unpunished is aggression repeated. If Beijing concludes that India will accept salami-sliced losses in exchange for summits and trade, then the next crisis is not a matter of if but when. And the next time, India may be more dependent, less trusted, and less prepared. Galwan should remain the anchor of our China policy, not the ghost we politely forget in the name of pragmatism.

Rejecting the reset does not mean rejecting dialogue. Geography ensures India must engage with China. But engagement must be transactional, conditional, and paired with capability-building. India must invest in intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, all-weather logistics, and denial capabilities. Send the clear signal that talks are welcome but preparedness is permanent.

On supply-chain diversification, incentivise domestic champions in APIs, semiconductors, and renewables. Forge sourcing partnerships with allies ranging from Australia to the US to Africa. Beijing should not hold our critical inputs hostage. Retain and strengthen FDI restrictions in critical sectors. Strategic technology must remain insulated from coercion.

Finally, this debate is not just about troops and trade. It is about who India chooses to be. The world looks to India today not just as a market or a military counterweight, but as the largest democracy — a civilisational state rooted in pluralism and openness. To clasp hands too tightly with Beijing, even as it represses Uyghurs, silences Tibet, and dismantles Hong Kong’s freedoms, is to dim our moral capital.

History is unkind to nations that mistake capitulation for strategy. India cannot afford to be one of them.

The writer serves as Global Goodwill Ambassador for Ukraine