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presence,a popular base and a large grassroots cadre.

Both Jinnah and the BJP challenged the Congress’s claims to represent all Indian voices impartially. Jinnah called Muslim Congressmen “puppets” and as late as 1948 called Mahatma Gandhi’s death a “great loss to the Hindu community”. Mirroring this,the BJP’s critique of the Congress focused on its failure to protect “Hindu” interests due to appeasement of minorities. Common to both: the belief that religious affiliation would also determine secular interests.

The figures of Jinnah and Jaswant are representative of the tension in simultaneously being a liberal constitutionalist and defining those you speak for on the basis of religion. I do not suggest an equivalence between the two parties,but merely suggest that they are both representative of one way to challenge the Congress model.

But,given the diversity of practices and traditions in India,it was essential that political projects construct a homogenous Hindu/ Muslim identity that could be politically mobilised. How did Jinnah do this? For one,he was instrumental in enacting the Shariat Act of 1937: it applied Shariat Law to all Muslims,including those like Jinnah’s own community of Khojas who had previously followed Hindu laws of succession.

Both parties grew rapidly in political importance over a very short period of time. In the popular elections of 1937,the Muslim League won only 109 of the 482 seats reserved for Muslims and less than 4 per cent of the vote,but in 1946 it swept almost all the Muslim seats. The BJP grew dramatically from 2 seats in 1984 to 119 in 1991. Beginning with an urban base,both parties grew through a combination of charm,popular mobilisation and violence. The Muslim League ironically had little presence in the Muslim-majority provinces. Jinnah convinced powerful regional Muslim politicians — leaders such as Sikandar Hayat Khan of Punjab and Fazlul Haq of Bengal — to ally with the Muslim League to gain greater leverage at the centre,where Jinnah would speak for them while leaving them with autonomy in their provinces. The BJP similarly grew by forging successful alliances with regional players in areas where it had little presence. Their geographical limitations and dependence on allies made them friendlier to ideas of federalism and devolution — at least till they came to power at the centre.

Their electoral growth is also symptomatic of disenchantment of various groups with the INC,and speaks equally for the INC’s failure to address the concerns of Muslims and Hindu middle classes.

They also forged alliances with popular religious leaders

and organisations. When constitutional politics failed,they could resort to violent mobilisations based on the fear of the Other — “Direct Action” in the case of the League,the Ram Mandir demolition for the BJP.

Ahistorical comparisons apart,the tendency to attribute Partition to the deeds and misdeeds of a handful of men (and Lady Mountbatten) is too convenient. The image of a cold and calculating Jinnah or a power-hungry Nehru credits them with a degree of foresight that they did not,in fact,possess. The Congress pushed for partition in the aftermath of the Calcutta riots believing the concession would stem the immediate violence. Few,either in the Congress or the League,had any conception of what Pakistan would mean. Neither Nehru nor Patel thought it would be permanent. Jinnah believed that he could visit his home in Bombay every winter. H.S. Suhrawardy,who continued to live in Calcutta after Partition,said he found no anomaly in being a member of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan while staying a citizen of India.

By seeking to lay the blame for Partition on this handful of men,we avoid answering the harder questions. Did a political partition necessarily imply mass violence? Was there voluntary migration — or ethnic cleansing? How complicit were the police and armed forces? Vazira Zamindar’s recent work demonstrates how a Pakistani government stretched for resources tried to check Muslim migration from India,and how the Indian administration often prevented Muslims who had fled to escape the violence in Delhi from coming back.

No memorials exist to Partition victims,no serious attempts were made to prosecute the perpetrators,and until recently little attempt was made to document the extent of its violence. Neither Jinnah nor Nehru led mobs through neighbourhoods. But by blaming them,perhaps it is we who seek to escape responsibility.

The writer is a historian at Princeton University

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