Opinion In creating new joint command structures, new CDS must proceed with caution

Possibly due to a misinterpretation of the Cabinet’s intent, the process of reform got off to a false start in 2020 with the coining of a new term — “theaterisation” — which became its driver. The creation of theatres should have been an end-state or ultimate aim of a process for engendering jointness and integration. But once the “cart was put before the horse”, the process, predictably, ran into inter-service conflict, resulting in a logjam that persists.

The nine-month delay in the appointment of the second CDS may turn out to be a blessing in disguise if it leads to introspection by our military and political leadership. Such introspection must take place against the background of the 30-month-old military confrontation with China and the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. Apart from this, there are some other imperatives that cannot be wished away.

First, any conflict with China will demand forces/resources from 4-6 of India’s 14 single service, and two tri-service commands (none of them co-located), as well the space and cyber agencies and the Special Forces division. Facing them will be the PLA’s combined-arms forces under the unitary commander of its Western Theatre Command. One can imagine the command/control and logistic nightmare such a situation could create for India’s operational commanders and the fiascos that could ensue. The obvious imperative is to integrate these 14 commands into 4-5 geographic or threat-based theatres and place necessary forces under a single commander charged with conduct of operations.

Second, the service chiefs have to reconcile themselves to the reality that once theatre commanders assume the “warfighter” role, they will be divested of operational responsibilities, and assume the “raise-train-sustain” functions, involving recruitment and training of personnel as well as acquisition of combat wherewithal. The theatre commanders will have service “component commanders” of two/three-star rank to render service-specific advice.

Third, while the component commanders may retain a linkage with their chiefs, the question of who will provide operational guidance to the theatre commanders still remains open.

The last issue relates to air power, which has been the cause of fierce controversies over resources, roles and missions. Beneath the facade of inter-service bonhomie hides this germ of discord, which no one wants to talk about. The idea that strategic bombing alone was the path to victory was propagated by air-power proponents, Billy Mitchell in America and Guilio Douhet in Italy. Command of the air, according to them, meant quick, cheap and decisive victory, making surface forces redundant.

Notwithstanding the failure of the WW II allied bomber offensive, a continued Western belief in the decisiveness of air power via “air dominance” has persisted during asymmetric conflicts in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Lebanon, Libya and Syria. However, none of these conflicts resulted in a “decisive victory” for the West nor did air power make a significant contribution.

While the IAF was justified in taking umbrage at being described as a “support arm” by the previous CDS, it is undeniable that as far as armies and navies are concerned, air power plays a “support function”, albeit, vital and indispensable. One of the lessons of 20th century conflicts was that wars are won and lost neither at sea nor in the air but on the ground by armies. Possibly, the same playbook is being re-enacted in Ukraine!

While “indivisibility of air power” may have been a good hypothetical construct in the past, the need of the hour is to find pragmatic modalities for sharing air power to enable future theatre commanders to counter the threat. The IAF’s reluctance to share assets must be tempered by the fact that the theatre air assets will be deployed on the advice of and by the IAF component commanders.

An area where the services have been remiss is in failing to initiate changes in professional military education even before the reform sequence was initiated. The very first step should have been to re-cast the present Staff College as a “Joint Services Staff College” with changes in its curriculum to produce “joint staff officers,” ready to serve in sister-service HQs, learning in the process to function as future component commanders and theatre commanders. Likewise for the three war colleges.

Finally, for those on Raisina Hill, there is much to be learnt from study of the thorny path of the US National Security Act of 1947, pushed through by President Truman in the face of bitter opposition from the US Navy. Or about the “Revolt of the Admirals” over cancellation of the “super-aircraft carrier,” which followed in 1949. Or how Secretary Defence Forrestal resolved the air power “roles & missions” conundrum via the “Key West Agreement” of 1948. And lastly, how it was two deeply concerned politicians, who persevered through four years of bitter debate, in the Pentagon, Congress and media to have the Goldwater-Nichols Act passed in 1986.

The writer is a retired chief of naval staff