Performance data released so far suggests that Aadhaar will provide more accurate identification than other programmes globally. Now,it must be used to improve public services for the poor
The Supreme Court interim order on Aadhaar,ruling that it could not be made compulsory for accessing public services,has already been appealed,with the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) joining the appeal earlier this week. This is only the latest round in a continuing debate that is not unique to India. Other countries wrestle with questions of identification and ID requirements,too. For instance,the ongoing dispute over the United States state voter ID laws pits those urging more restrictive photo IDs to combat alleged voter fraud against those arguing that this will discourage the countrys poorest citizens,most of whom are less likely to have them,from voting. That there is a debate on Aadhaar should not be a big surprise,especially as the UID programme is very unusual.
UID is already the largest and most ambitious ID programme in the world and at about $3 per head,it is also the least expensive. In contrast to other programmes,it has released data on technical performance. It relies on remote biometric authentication against a central database,rather than a card. Most distinctively,it is not an NID,as it confers no claim to citizenship,nor is it a functional ID like a drivers licence,which entitles its holder to a particular right or programme. As a tool for identification and authentication created ahead of legislation on its purpose and limitations on its uses,the UID is truly unique.
As countries develop towards middle-income status and beyond and their economies become more sophisticated,they and their citizens need stronger formal ID. The poor need this most of all; it is no accident that the poorest and most excluded are also invariably those without recognised identification. Strong ID at the national level can head off a proliferation of multiple IDs,each for a different purpose,often less secure and of a lower quality,many requiring citizens to deal with multiple systems. Nigeria,for instance,has at least 12,most of them biometric.
There is still the question of whether the UID can deliver on its goal to provide robust identification to Indias huge population,but the performance data released by the programme suggests that it will provide far more accurate identification than other programmes globally. Continuing to release data will reinforce confidence in the system.
The next challenge is to use Aadhaar to improve the quality of and access to public services by the poor. Much of the opposition to a strong ID programme comes from vested interests that benefit from maintaining status quo. They can include ghost workers or pensioners,others who divert funds from public programmes,and lower-level officials fearful of losing the power and discretion to allocate resources. Strong ID coupled with electronic payment has been effective in containing losses and diversions in many cases,such as Pakistans Watan card programme,set up to help flood victims after the devastating floods of 2010.
However,quality and access need to be demonstrated; ID requirements must not become a barrier to legitimate beneficiaries,especially the poor. As it is incorporated into programmes,Aadhaar must be easily and freely available,and NGOs and community groups can help,as in some other countries. The operational performance of the new systems should be monitored carefully and impartially. Is remote authentication smooth,and are electronic payments received quickly? How does the system handle failures and errors? Is there an effective dispute resolution mechanism? Do beneficiary surveys show that the new system is better? The UIDAI has been a leader in disclosing performance data and should extend this by posting such data,as well as evidence of savings,on its website. This in turn will place pressure on the programmes using Aadhaar to be accessible,efficient and responsive.
The voluntary nature of Aadhaar does not mean that strong ID should not be required for public programmes and payments. The government should clarify policy to the effect that reliable ID will be required in future. In the interim,of course,generous exception policies will be needed to manage those without Aadhaar,but if (and only if) the new systems are accessible and efficient,the number of exceptions will fall as requirements are tightened. While there will always need to be some exceptions anyway for those unable to use the biometric system,it might be beneficial to make Aadhaar mandatory for certain purposes for example,salary payments through bank accounts tied into de-duplicated IDs have helped reduce public payroll fraud in some countries. However,it would be difficult to make Aadhaar mandatory for all before a framework is in place to provide for privacy and the protection of personal data,including appropriate limits on the use of Aadhaar to link databases. This is a high priority.
The court ruling that bars the issue of Aadhaar to illegal immigrants is understandable,but needs to be reconsidered. Insisting on extensive documentation for enrolment would raise serious barriers to the inclusion of the very poor,few of whom have birth certificates or other documents. An emerging India needs to break the intergenerational cycle of undocumented parents and children that many countries face. It is also far better to be able to identify those residing on national territory than have a large,undocumented population getting around on easily forged papers. Like other systems,the UID has the ability to revoke the use of its credentials. It can flag a yes/ no authentication response as invalid,meaning that an Aadhaar number cannot be used,for example,when an individual is deported. It also keeps a record of documentation captured during the enrolment process. At the same time,retention of the biometric and demographic data makes it difficult for an individual to enrol again under another name. This is a unique strength of the system that many countries would envy.
The successful delivery of a strong ID would undoubtedly be a huge benefit for India. The debate on Aadhaar,therefore,needs to look at what the datas saying,and the
big picture.
The writer is senior fellow,Centre
for Global Development,Washington DC,USThe Supreme Court interim order on Aadhaar,ruling that it could not be made compulsory for accessing public services,has already been appealed,with the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) joining the appeal earlier this week. This is only the latest round in a continuing debate that is not unique to India. Other countries wrestle with questions of identification and ID requirements,too. For instance,the ongoing dispute over the United States state voter ID laws pits those urging more restrictive photo IDs to combat alleged voter fraud against those arguing that this will discourage the countrys poorest citizens,most of whom are less likely to have them,from voting. That there is a debate on Aadhaar should not be a big surprise,especially as the UID programme is very unusual.
Globally,the use of biometric ID systems is growing rapidly. Our ongoing work at the Centre for Global Development surveyed about 160 cases across 70 developing countries. Some are multi-purpose national identity programmes (NIDs). In Peru,it is virtually impossible for citizens to engage in formal transactions without an ID number and card issued by RENIEC,a specialised agency. Others are functional IDs,rolled out to serve specific purposes,such as managing public payrolls and pension systems,or cash transfer and health insurance programmes. Indian examples include the biometric ID card for the Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana (RSBY). In order to reduce fraud,biometric IDs are also increasingly issued by private companies and NGOs to identify clients or authenticate employees involved in individual transactions.
UID is already the largest and most ambitious ID programme in the world and at about $3 per head,it is also the least expensive. In contrast to other programmes,it has released data on technical performance. It relies on remote biometric authentication against a central database,rather than a card. Most distinctively,it is not an NID,as it confers no claim to citizenship,nor is it a functional ID like a drivers licence,which entitles its holder to a particular right or programme. As a tool for identification and authentication created ahead of legislation on its purpose and limitations on its uses,the UID is truly unique.
As countries develop towards middle-income status and beyond and their economies become more sophisticated,they and their citizens need stronger formal ID. The poor need this most of all; it is no accident that the poorest and most excluded are also invariably those without recognised identification. Strong ID at the national level can head off a proliferation of multiple IDs,each for a different purpose,often less secure and of a lower quality,many requiring citizens to deal with multiple systems. Nigeria,for instance,has at least 12,most of them biometric.
There is still the question of whether the UID can deliver on its goal to provide robust identification to Indias huge population,but the performance data released by the programme suggests that it will provide far more accurate identification than other programmes globally. Continuing to release data will reinforce confidence in the system.
The next challenge is to use Aadhaar to improve the quality of and access to public services by the poor. Much of the opposition to a strong ID programme comes from vested interests that benefit from maintaining status quo. They can include ghost workers or pensioners,others who divert funds from public programmes,and lower-level officials fearful of losing the power and discretion to allocate resources. Strong ID coupled with electronic payment has been effective in containing losses and diversions in many cases,such as Pakistans Watan card programme,set up to help flood victims after the devastating floods of 2010.
However,quality and access need to be demonstrated; ID requirements must not become a barrier to legitimate beneficiaries,especially the poor. As it is incorporated into programmes,Aadhaar must be easily and freely available,and NGOs and community groups can help,as in some other countries. The operational performance of the new systems should be monitored carefully and impartially. Is remote authentication smooth,and are electronic payments received quickly? How does the system handle failures and errors? Is there an effective dispute resolution mechanism? Do beneficiary surveys show that the new system is better? The UIDAI has been a leader in disclosing performance data and should extend this by posting such data,as well as evidence of savings,on its website. This in turn will place pressure on the programmes using Aadhaar to be accessible,efficient and responsive.
The voluntary nature of Aadhaar does not mean that strong ID should not be required for public programmes and payments. The government should clarify policy to the effect that reliable ID will be required in future. In the interim,of course,generous exception policies will be needed to manage those without Aadhaar,but if (and only if) the new systems are accessible and efficient,the number of exceptions will fall as requirements are tightened. While there will always need to be some exceptions anyway for those unable to use the biometric system,it might be beneficial to make Aadhaar mandatory for certain purposes for example,salary payments through bank accounts tied into de-duplicated IDs have helped reduce public payroll fraud in some countries. However,it would be difficult to make Aadhaar mandatory for all before a framework is in place to provide for privacy and the protection of personal data,including appropriate limits on the use of Aadhaar to link databases. This is a high priority.
The court ruling that bars the issue of Aadhaar to illegal immigrants is understandable,but needs to be reconsidered. Insisting on extensive documentation for enrolment would raise serious barriers to the inclusion of the very poor,few of whom have birth certificates or other documents. An emerging India needs to break the intergenerational cycle of undocumented parents and children that many countries face. It is also far better to be able to identify those residing on national territory than have a large,undocumented population getting around on easily forged papers. Like other systems,the UID has the ability to revoke the use of its credentials. It can flag a yes/ no authentication response as invalid,meaning that an Aadhaar number cannot be used,for example,when an individual is deported. It also keeps a record of documentation captured during the enrolment process. At the same time,retention of the biometric and demographic data makes it difficult for an individual to enrol again under another name. This is a unique strength of the system that many countries would envy.
The successful delivery of a strong ID would undoubtedly be a huge benefit for India. The debate on Aadhaar,therefore,needs to look at what the datas saying,and the
big picture.
Alan Gelb
The writer is senior fellow,Centre
for Global Development,Washington DC,US
