A train crash that killed 40 people and injured over a hundred is a heartbreaking tragedy in any country. But China is no ordinary country. The first-ever bullet train accident that occurred on July 23 in eastern China has now morphed from a calamity into a political crisis. After the train wreck,the Chinese government was criticised for its inept response,misleading information and reluctance to disclose the causes of the accident (most likely faulty equipment). The ferocity of public criticism against an ostensibly powerful one-party state caught most observers by surprise. In particular,the firestorm of public outrage was initially ignited by postings and comments on the Internet. They quickly went viral and sparked a strong nationwide outcry that forced the ruling Communist Party to dispatch the premier to the site of the accident,fire mid-level railway officials and double the amount of compensation for victims.
What is notable about this political crisis is not only the humiliating loss of face suffered by the Communist Party (in particular,the corruption-ridden railway ministry),which only a month ago showcased the Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway as its signature achievement in modernising China. More importantly,the process in which a serious public safety disaster was turned into a legitimacy-threatening political crisis shows the power of the Internet in China in rallying and channelling public opinion.
The upshot of Beijings vast investments in countering the information revolution is that,contrary to the initial expectations that the information revolution would undermine the Chinese regimes control of information flow,the Chinese Communist Party appeared to have achieved the impossible: have its cake and eat it,too. China has not only seen the growth of the Internet as a dynamic economic sector,but also managed to control it politically.
This conclusion,as shown by the recent anti-government firestorm on the Internet over the train crash,is both premature and incorrect.
The truth about the Internet and its political effects in China is far more complicated. While it is true that the Chinese government has developed and maintained its capacity to impose a sophisticated censorship regime,its censorship is far from effective. In fact,because the Communist Party is fighting the equivalent of an information insurgency,it is perpetually on the defensive. It reacts,often after a considerable time lag,to the political initiatives taken by countless Chinese individuals who want to challenge the power of the state and break its monopoly on the flow of information.
One can draw two insights from this situation. First,the Chinese state cannot win this information war. Like conventional insurgents,Chinese netizens win by not losing. In this case,as long as Beijing allows the Internet,the netizens will never lose. Second,even though the Chinese government,when fully determined,always manages to block and stifle the discussion of sensitive political topics on the Internet,its bureaucracy can never react fast or nimbly enough to suppress the dissemination of information or discussion of public policy issues that undermine the legitimacy of the ruling Communist Party.
Take,for example,the issue of corruption. Given the pervasiveness of corruption among Chinese officials,instances of official malfeasance occur daily and provide fuel for public ire. Even though the party is not willing to advertise its own failings,it is helpless in preventing the Internet from exposing,regularly,scandals involving party officials (for example,the former head of the railway ministry was recently arrested for corruption). The cumulative political effect of the Internets coverage of the systemic rot inside the Chinese government and its ruling party can only be political delegitimisation. Such routine muckraking does not spark an instant revolution,but it does erode the partys credibility,slowly but surely.
What the political aftermath of Chinas bullet train crash revealed is that the Internet in China has acquired another important political function: enforcing political accountability on a one-party state. Without Chinas aggressive netizens,it is unimaginable that the Communist Party would have caved in to public pressure,sacked railway officials,and doubled compensation for the victims. What is encouraging is that this is not the first time that a powerful government retreated in face of strong public opinion. Many similar incidents have occurred in the past.
The Chinese Communist Partys less-than-happy experience with the Internet serves as a powerful reminder to all governments in the world,including democratic ones: you can never win against a population empowered by the information revolution and should never try.
The writer is a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College in the US
express@expressindia.com