Opinion Al-Qaeda’s new front

First it was the daring attack last month on Westgate mall in the heart of Nairobi in which more than 60 people died,including three Indians. This was a deadly operation by al-Shabaab,known for its connections to al-Qaeda,in which Samantha Lewthwaite,a white British convert to Islam and the widow of one of the participants in the July 2005 London attacks,is suspected to have been involved. The latest in the chain of events following the Westgate horror is the abduction on October 10 of Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan,who was surprisingly released after a few hours of detention. It is claimed that this act was in retaliation for two questionable US operations on October 5,one on Libyan soil and the other in Somalia. In the former,Abu Anas al-Liby,wanted for the 1998 attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam,was abducted in Tripoli on his way home from morning prayers. Since then,the Pentagon has admitted that the exercise was conducted by its elite Delta Force,and that al-Liby was being held in a “secure location”. In the other episode,about 20 US Navy Seals made an unsuccessful foray at Barawe,a fishing town,more than 100 miles from the Somalian capital,Mogadishu,to capture a few al-Shabaab operatives (especially Abdulkadir Mohamed Abdulkadir,a senior commander) suspected in the Nairobi mall attack. The Seals had to make an inglorious retreat once they were fired upon and the confidentiality of the mission was lost. This,in particular,showed that al-Qaeda and its supporters were a match for US security forces.

International observers question the propriety and legality of the two operations. US Secretary of State John Kerry has taken the lofty position that both operations were in self-defence,and cites the Authorisation for Use of Military Force against Terrorists (AUMF) of 2001,which empowers the president to use force against any organisation that he determines was responsible for 9/11. Some legal pundits,however,opined that though the raids may have conformed to domestic law there is a problem with international law,because the US’s stand that there was an ongoing non-international conflict with al-Qaeda has not been endorsed across nations. Possibly the Barawe foray was even more questionable as it was directed against al-Shabaab,an organisation that came into existence much after 9/11.

More pertinent is the wide perception that al-Qaeda’s ideology is more visible than before in the most unlikely of places,and it is no longer confined to either the Af-Pak region or the Middle East. The influence of regional groups in North Africa,like al-Shabaab (Somalia),al-Hijra (Kenya) and Boko Haram (Nigeria),is of concern. The bond between them points to the liklihood of chaos in this region in the future.

Observers like Juan Zarate,a former US deputy national security advisor,attach greater importance to the uncertainty in the Levant. Reports from Syria in particular speak of heightened al-Qaeda influence,with the formidable Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) spreading its influence in the northern province of Raqqa. The continual stream of foreign jihadists pouring into Syria to strengthen the rebels fighting to oust President Bashar al-Assad complicate the situation. A majority of them are radicalised Muslim youths from Europe and North America. Their return,at a later date,to their home countries could be disastrous.

All signs suggest that this is a dynamic and explosive situation that confronts many countries. This deflates the optimism that US President Barack Obama voiced a few months ago when he said that the back of al-Qaeda had been broken. This smugness seems to have given way to desperation,as evidenced by the recent daring but highly controversial operations in Somalia and Libya. Unstable and corrupt regimes,both in the Middle East and North Africa,may be expected to provide space for disgruntled young radicals to hit out at the non-Islamic world. If fellow Muslims suffer collateral damage,it does not appear to bother their conscience,as long their intended targets suffer greater harm. Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri focused attention on the US,exhorting his followers to conduct individual jihad. More dangerous was the personal attack on Obama,labelling him an “apostate”. This alone indicates the extremes that al-Qaeda has been driven to. The “financial war” against terrorists,to which Zarate refers in his just-released Treasury War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare may,after all,have had only a marginal impact on al-Qaeda and its sympathisers. The US is now hard-pressed to contend with the indoctrination and fanaticism fulled by a small band of inward-looking clerics for whom the advocacy of violence comes naturally. The controversial extraterritorial adventures by American forces could contribute to an escalation of terrorist violence.

Where does India figures in all this? The Indian Mujahideen,perhaps the only formidable and organised terrorist group in the country,may lack the numbers. But it has support from across our borders. Our intelligence agencies have a hard task at hand to keep a tab on the inspiration that the IM derives from the recent happenings in Africa and the Middle East. The one common thread — the availability of indoctrinated youth — is a factor that should push up our anxiety. New Delhi and the state governments can not afford to ignore this while drawing up a counterterrorism strategy. The mechanical use of the police and ignoring the need to formulate imaginative schemes to take care of the feelings of alienated Muslims will be counterproductive.

The writer is a former CBI director