Young, communist, modern and high-tech

Four members of the CMC head the four departments: the general staff, logistics, armament and political departments under the CMC. What is more significant is that perhaps, for the first time, all four commanders of the four wings of the military8212;that is, the ground forces, air force, navy and the nuclear-missile forces designated as Second Artillery8212;have been made members of the CMC. Closer scrutiny would show that this is in response to the needs of planning and fighting a modern high-technology war, where air power, space and information warfare including network-centric warfare capabilities assume importance.

The new composition of the CMC indicates a more balanced generation of capabilities of different branches of the military. For example, while the size of the ground forces has been reduced by almost one-third, that of the air force has been increasing. The air force is no longer seen merely as a supporting service for the ground forces.

The Chinese military doctrine aims to generate 8216;8216;integrated fighting power8217;8217; and not merely integrated structures and forces. The basic principle expressed in typical Chinese characteristics is that 8216;8216;one plus one exceeds two8217;8217;. This has come together in the Rapid Reaction Forces, to undertake intense high-technology 8216;8216;quick fighting, quick resolution8217;8217; under conditions of high-tech regional warfare.

China8217;s military modernisation recognises the limitations of economic and technological resources, and hence has been highly selective in its focus and priorities. The annual report of the US Secretary of Defence to the Congress has been emphasising that 8216;8216;The principal area where China appears to be making advances in coercive military capabilities involves airpower, to include missiles and information operations8217;8217;. More than a decade of access to Russian design technology and expertise has already almost dramatically altered the operational capabilities of the Chinese air force and space capabilities. Compared to the non-use of its air force in 1962, or the very marginal use of its air force in the brief war with Vietnam in 1979, we are already witnessing the emergence of completely different aerospace capabilities along with the changes in military leadership towards much greater professionalism.

On the other hand, the greatest focus in our country seems to be on the least critical aspect of Chinese military modernisation, that is on China8217;s naval power projection. Which is not to suggest that naval modernisation is not significant. But this is to highlight that if lack of logistics in the high Himalayas defeated the Indian Army in 1962, our ability to successfully defend ourselves against any potential challenge in and from aerospace would impact on our land forces in the battlefield far more than the other two services. The Pakistani army certainly learnt the lesson five years ago in the Kargil sector. And the answer does not lie in structural ownership of capabilities but, as China is demonstrating, in corporate collegiate planning and management. China has imbibed the lessons of recent wars, especially the focus of US military strategy, since any armed conflict over Taiwan could bring the US military power into confrontation with the Chinese military. But the real impact of military modernisation is on China8217;s neighbours.

But all this does not add up to what has been argued erroneously as the 8216;8216;China threat8217;8217;. Changes in China8217;s military organisation, weapons and doctrine only reflect the changes taking place worldwide. Our own interests require friendly relations with China without ignoring our future capabilities, in harmony with the bilaterally agreed principle of 8216;8216;mutual and equal security8217;8217; to ensure peace and tranquillity between the two Asian giants whose bilateral relations would have a profound impact on world affairs in the 21st century. What we need to ensure is that while both China and India modernise their military forces and systems, we also should step up bilateral military-to-military contacts and exchanges to ensure that no misunderstanding crops up.