Whining is no strategy

Apart from following the media on the subject, I have taken part in several seminars and discussions with foreign interlocuters present. The positions 8212; posturing 8212; of the Indian side can be categorised as follows:The cribbing orwhining approach. This involves complaining about the West and China helping Pakistan become a nuclear-weapons state; Pakistan being treated more leniently; the inaccuracy of the idea that Pakistani nuclear weaponisation is a consequence of India8217;s weaponisation; China and Israel being treated differently from India on their tests; India not being given due importance and credit for being a democratic and a responsible state; the world not acknowledging India8217;s security concerns, and so on.

The second category strikes the 8220;self-righteous posture8221;. Members of the strategic establishment, military and academic think-tankers preface their assertions with the inane cliche 8220;I am not a diplomat; I am a simple scholar, soldier, etc; so I will be direct8221;. They lecture their audience, especially if it is foreign, in a hectoring tone about the nuclear powers8217; double standards, hypocrisy, legitimisation of nuclear weapons through NPT extension, the CTBT and FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty proposals.

Theystress India8217;s self-abnegating nuclear restraint for 24 years and the world8217;s insensitivity to its security concerns which compelled it to go nuclear. It is demanded that India should be recognised as a nuclear-weapons state and hinted that it may otherwise become anarchic in nuclear matters. There was also a demand that Kashmir and the subcontinental tests should not be linked by the international community.

The third approach is self-flagellation combined with an emotional and placating plea to the world that a fair number of Indians are not nuclear warmongers, and are profoundly opposed to nuclear weaponisation.

The fourth emphasises the compulsions of India8217;s weaponisation, while arguing that the management of the political and public relations fallout has been inept. Foreign-returned 8220;Indian scholars and commentators8221; argue that India conducted its tests without thinking through their implications.

They patronisingly assert that Indian thinking about its security, especially on nuclearweaponisation, is 8220;in its infancy,8221; that India cannot match the wisdom of the nuclear-weapons states and the West in this regard. Therefore, if the West is patient and engages India in formulating nuclear doctrines, the present differences can be overcome.

The initial xenophobic euphoria has been replaced by satisfaction at India having proved its technological and defence capacities. Public opinion is not permeated by jingoism and is opposed to confrontation. Opinion in the metropolitan areas is divided. Some influential segments are opposed to weaponisation. The rest of urban and semi-urban India is generally supportive, but fears that the political and economic pressures may not be manageable. It is uncertain about how any government would cope with the tests8217; consequences. The majority of Indians, the rural population, is not aware of the implications. There may be a vague sense of achievement, but opinion is not informed. Neither the government nor the political parties have undertaken a programme ofpublic education. Nuclear policies not based on a general consensus will be unsustainable, whichever course they take. Many of the arguments outlined above have been part of the briefs and official and technical discussions between the government and other powers since the tests. Yet will a demanding, self-righteous approach make the world come round to our point of view? Which negotiating stance would sustain our nuclear and missile policies and ensure our security without getting us into a confrontationist mode?

The hectoring and self-righteous approach at the government or public level is futile. The world is tired of India8217;s self-righteous didacticism. We should limit ourselves to conveying that India did what it had to do in its self-interest, after serious thought. It regrets that the world does not perceive its decision in terms of its rationale and compulsions. It accepts its difference of opinion for now, but is willing to participate in the general endeavour for world disarmament, peace andstability. We should not demand nuclear-weapons status. We need to be self-assured about our status and sustain it as a strategic and material reality. We must signal that we do not need the world8217;s certification. Prime Minister Vajpayee has already defined two basic elements of our nuclear doctrine. First, that India is willing to become party to international non-proliferation regimes as far as they are non-discriminatory and do not affect India8217;s national security. Second, that India makes a unilateral commitment of no-first-use and no use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states.

The assertion that India has not thought through the implications of nuclear weaponisation is incorrect. It was a complex decision taken after excruciating analysis over two decades. While the command and control systems will be the responsibility of relevant technical and defence-force elements, overall political control will remain with an elected civilian power structure. India does not expect the pressures orsanctions to go in the short or even the medium term. The government has acknowledged this and signalled its willingness to cope. This is the framework within which we should negotiate with nuclear powers and other important powers. That we are firm about maintaining our nuclear capacities for our security and that, subject to this, we are willing to join the mainstream of non-proliferation negotiations is a rational approach. The other debates are at best a post-mortem and at worst a cogitation in abstractions which does not relate to the existing Indian reality and its geo-strategic ramifications.