Which way will Tehran go?

Even as the United States struggles to fix the troubled reconstruction of Iraq, the next big national security crisis has already descended on Washington. Investigators from the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA have discovered that Iran is trying to acquire the capability to enrich uranium and separate plutonium, activities that would allow it to make fissile material for nuclear weapons. Revelations of Iran8217;s massive secret programme have convinced even doubtful European governments that Tehran8217;s ultimate aim is to acquire the weapons or, at least, the ability to produce them whenever it wants.

It is an open question whether the United States could learn to coexist with a nuclear Iran8230; There is no question, however, that the United States, the Middle East, and probably the rest of the world would be better off if they did not have to deal with a nuclear Iran. The hard part, of course, is making sure that Tehran never gets to that point. It appears to have made considerable progress in many aspects of its nuclear programme, thanks to extensive assistance from Chinese, Germans, Pakistanis, Russians, and perhaps North Koreans. Iran8217;s clerical regime has also shown itself willing to endure considerable sacrifices to achieve its most important objectives.

Yet there is reason to believe that Tehran8217;s course can still be changed, if Washington takes advantage of the regime8217;s vulnerabilities. Although Iran8217;s hard-line leadership has maintained a remarkable unity of purpose in the face of reformist challengers, it is badly fragmented over key foreign policy issues, including the importance of nuclear weapons. At one end of the spectrum are the hardest of the hard-liners, who disparage economic and diplomatic considerations and put Iran8217;s security concerns ahead of all others. At the opposite end are pragmatists, who believe that fixing Iran8217;s failing economy must trump all else if the clerical regime is to retain power over the long term. In between these camps waver many of Iran8217;s most important power brokers, who would prefer not to have to choose between bombs and butter.

This split provides an opportunity for the US, and its allies in Europe and Asia, to forge a new strategy to derail Iran8217;s drive for nuclear weapons.

Excerpted from an article by Kenneth Pollack and Ray Takeyh in 8216;Foreign Affairs8217;, March/April 2005