As Trump raises the Russia-China spectre over Greenland, what exactly are their interests in the Arctic?

US interests have also been linked to rare earth mineral deposits in Greenland, despite significant scepticism around the feasibility of extraction, and a sheet of ice covering about 80% of the land. Here is what is known of Chinese and Russian interests in the region.

China’s ‘Polar Silk Road’ and attempted inroads

In a 2018 white paper, the Chinese government outlined its policy goals on the Arctic region, positioning itself as a stakeholder by self-identifying as a “Near-Arctic State”, despite its considerable distance from the Arctic.

It added that “the natural conditions of the Arctic and their changes have a direct impact on China’s climate system… and, in turn, on its economic interests in agriculture, forestry, fishery, marine industry and other sectors.”

“Global warming in recent years has accelerated the melting of ice… As economic globalization and regional integration further develops and deepens, the Arctic is gaining global significance for its rising strategic, economic values and those relating to scientific research, environmental protection, sea passages, and natural resources,” it said.

China also called itself a major power that was closely involved in areas like “climate change, environment, scientific research, utilisation of shipping routes, resource exploration and exploitation, security, and global governance.” It pointed out milestones in diplomatic engagement — China was the first Asian country to host the Arctic Science Summit Week in 2005.

In 2013, it became an accredited observer to the Arctic Council. The grouping has the eight Arctic states as members: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States. India is also an observer state, as are others like Japan and Germany.

China has also invested in Greenland’s Kvanefjeld project, which could potentially hold one of the world’s largest rare earths reserves. The country already dominates the processing of these minerals, used in industries ranging from tech to defence, and they have become a key leverage for China during its tariff war with the US. The presence of uranium at Kvanefjeld has, however, led to protests from the local population against mining, with the matter going to court.

Another aspect of China’s involvement is the “Polar Silk Road,” framed as part of its global infrastructure investments, for the development of Arctic shipping routes. The Guardian reported that last year, the first liner vessel travelled from China to Europe via the Northern Sea Route (where China is increasingly attempting to play a role), compared to the 27 days it would take via the Middle East.

However, there has been pushback to this growing presence.

According to a 2020 report by the Dutch think tank Clingendael Institute, a former Danish prime minister allegedly prevented the Hong Kong company General Nice from acquiring an abandoned naval base, “confirming Danish concerns about the prospects of a growing Chinese presence in Greenland.”

Chinese companies later attempted to finance some airports in Greenland, but the Danish government — which handles the domains of foreign policy, defence and security for the autonomous territory — stepped in. In 2019, The Wall Street Journal reported that the US Department of Defense had raised an alarm to the Danish government about China.

For its part, China has denied allegations of harbouring militaristic intentions. An editorial in Global Times, the English daily of the Chinese Communist Party, underlined that its activities were restricted to commerce and research: “The US’ hype about a so-called “China’s Arctic threat” is, in essence, an attempt to confuse the public and conceal its own military expansion, unilateral resource extraction, and pursuit of hegemony in the Arctic.”

Where Russia and China converge

The Danish government’s 2025 Intelligence Outlook noted that “In recent years, the United States has significantly increased its security policy focus on the Arctic, while Russia continues its military build-up, and China continues to develop its capacity to operate both submarines and surface vessels in the region.”

It called Russia “the strongest military power in the Arctic”, adding that Western sanctions on Russia will lead it to “deepen its Arctic cooperation with China and allow China greater access to the Russian Arctic.”

Russia has historically maintained a presence in the Arctic. A paper for the think tank Carnegie Endowment for International Peace noted, “The discovery of oil and gas in Siberia — below and above the Arctic Circle — in the twentieth century offered wealth and hard currency, enabled domestic consumption, funded the Soviet military machine, and provided the economic foundation for the Soviet Union to pursue its foreign policy objectives.”

This continued in the modern era. The Center for Strategic and International Studies said of Russia, “In the past decade, it has revitalized Soviet-era bases, deployed missile defense systems, invested in domain awareness capabilities, increased aerial and maritime patrols, and stepped up its exercise schedule.” One example is the Nagurskoye air base, located at a latitude of around 80.80° North, which has expanded significantly since its inception in the ’50s.

A 2022 Reuters report, citing data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, found that “Russia now has 11 submarines capable of launching long-range nuclear weapons for use in an all-out nuclear war, eight of them based in the Arctic Kola Peninsula… NATO has 22 between the United States, France and the UK.”

China and Russia have also collaborated for military exercises near the Arctic region, of late. China could also lend financial and technical heft to Russia in prospecting for minerals and in expanding commerce, but there are limitations to the partnership. Analysts have pointed out that, as an Arctic state, Russia would not favour Chinese presence to expand beyond a point.

However, with Trump’s bellicose rhetoric on Greenland, including new threats to allies in Europe, there could emerge another area of convergence for China and Russia.