Two facts are evident from the abduction of the Malkangiri district collector,R. Vineel Krishna,and his colleague,Pabitra Majhi,by Maoists. First,Maoists fear nothing more than representatives of the state reaching out and extending a helping hand to the poor,in whose name they have been waging their protracted war against the state,kidnapping and killing security personnel and civilians and destroying infrastructure and utilities. Second,beyond a certain tipping point,people across society were bound to raise their voice in anger and disgust. The online campaign for Krishna and Majhis release ties in with the spontaneous shutdowns in Malkangiri,as well as other districts of Orissa where the young IAS officer had been posted,in protest against the abduction. Krishna,reportedly,made an effort to understand the problems of the poor and initiated programmes for their benefit. Reportedly,these initiatives had begun to wean prospective recruits away from the Maoists. That explains the instantaneous response from the districts that had him for an interface with the state as well as the emotion of friends,colleagues and strangers asking for his and his colleagues release,fearing the damage this case might do to honest,hard work in the civil services.
But,more importantly,it exposes and explains the irritation of Maoists with efforts to reach out to the tribals. Notwithstanding the long list of their demands on the release of jailed comrades,cancellation of mining and industrial projects,and an end to Operation Green Hunt,the state must be absolutely clear-sighted about what exactly it is dealing with. Securing the release of kidnapped personnel calls for a cali- brated,cautious approach,but the Orissa government which suspended combing operations after the abduction cannot make the mistake of offering an olive branch to the Naxals,especially now when its on the backfoot. Orissa has also been one of the laggard states in moving against Naxals. Setbacks such as this are specific and need judicious,persistent effort,but they cannot put the overarching dual policy of development and paramilitary operations in the freezer.