Its the state

If the gun comes to define politics in West Bengal,surely the genesis of that political culture does not lie in the present problems in West Midnapore district. But it is in that district that the CPM seems to be looking to legitimise its newfound,and dangerously misguided,strategy of arming the party cadre to engage in gun battles with the Maoists as last weeks violence near Enayatpur showed. Whether or not the CPM has considered the consequences of its decision,it is the logical extension of the partys three-decade-old practice of substituting administration by party. But if the CPM believes that armed cadre can defeat the Maoists and then restore law and order as well as the peoples sense of security and their confidence in the state machinery,it couldnt be more mistaken.

Fighting the Maoists and neutralising their operational capability is the task of police and security forces. That is why the CRPF were dispatched to Lalgarh to assist the state police in June. That is how Andhra Pradesh,which offers the best model for counter-offensives against Naxalites,has tackled the menace with its dedicated Greyhound force and intricate local intelligence. It is needless to say that the Bengal government is not in a position to raise a local,dedicated anti-Maoist force like the Greyhounds. But it had sought and received Central paramilitary forces for Lalgarh,which it must still deploy along with the state police to eradicate Maoist violence. Unfortunately,the biggest constituent of the ruling Left Front has a pathological tendency to make a bad situation worse. Even some of its Left partners have warned that an armed resistance would cause anarchy although CPM supporters have been bearing the Maoist brunt.

Besides,a mainstream political party has no business taking the law into its own hands.

Most importantly,the CPMs decision betrays the administrative decay it has overseen in the state,whereby its police force cannot be counted upon to do its job. A politicised administration,with a police force often used as a party tool,which nevertheless is under-equipped and under-staffed to operate on this scale,can only think of solutions to law-and-order problems in terms of party cadre. The plight of villagers caught in the crossfire between Maoists and security personnel in Bengal is precisely the result of an administration that had abdicated its responsibility. Filling that administrative vacuum with guns and partymen can only be the gory culmination of the CPMs utterly confused and hitherto half-hearted strategy against Maoists.