Waylaid by a wayward process

India had opened diplomatic relations with Israel primarily on the rationale that the PLO was itself negotiating an agreement with Israel. Arab countries themselves had close relations with the United States despite its closeness to Israel. So their placing a ban on India in this respect was not logical. A third subconscious factor was the Indian feeling that despite its unqualified commitment to Palestinian aspirations and support of Arab causes, there was no Arab reciprocity on Kashmir and Pakistan.

India consulted Yasser Arafat and got his general endorsement before opening diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992. Close relations with Arab countries are most important. The Gulf countries and Iran are vital sources of oil and petroleum products. They employ a large number of Indians whose earnings contribute to our foreign exchange reserves. Arab sea lanes and airspace are of vital economic and strategic interest. Added to these are historical and cultural affinities and the Islamic dimension of India8217;s polity.

At the macro level, the end of the Cold War and the global orientation towards non-compartmentalised and harmonious relations between countries impelled India to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. There was an assessment that direct contacts would help it influence Israeli policies, making them more accommodative of Palestinians8217; legitimate aspirations. There was, of course, the prospect of beneficial economic, technological and, to some extent, politico-strategic equations. The Indian rationale proved largely valid till Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres and their party remained in power. With Netanyahu8217;s advent, there has been a negative refraction, though substantive cooperation continues.

Since 1992 India and Israel have signed agreements for cooperation in agriculture, science and technology, culture and education, civil aviation, tourism, trade and economic relations. India8217;s exports to Israel have risen from 75 million in 1992 to 156.7 million in the first seven months of 1997. Israel8217;s exports in the same period rose from 127 million to 241.7 million. Agreements on bilateral investments, avoidance of double taxation and establishment of shipping connections are in the pipeline. Around 60 joint ventures are functioning in the private sector. The point is that these trends were initiated by Israel8217;s previous Labour government. In spite of the inherent vibrancy and potential for expanding relations, the process is likely to run into difficulties because of the state of the Middle East peace process, which has stalled primarily due to the paranoid self-centred approach of Netanyahu and Likud extremists. India8217;s relations with the Palestinian Authority and other Arab countries will be subject to the tensions affecting the PLO and intra-Arab relations.

Netanyahu is backing out of important commitments to the Palestinians. His delaying of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from designated Arab enclaves, encouraging Israeli settlements on the West Bank and reluctance to build up the strength of the Palestinian Authority have affected Arafat8217;s credibility and created deep divisions in the Jewish population of Israel itself.

Arafat faces an erosion of his leadership and growing Arab indifference to the Palestinian cause, regardless of the lip service to it in Arab and Islamic multilateral fora. The Israeli Government8217;s dilution of the Oslo and Camp David accords has increased the credibility of Hamas and other Arab groups that have no faith in the peace process. Arafat8217;s failing health and the embryonic struggle to succeed him between Col. Dgibriel Rajoub Head of the Security Services on the West Bank, Col. Mohammad Dahlan Chief of Palestinian Security in Gaza and others such as Abu Mazen and Khaled Salam have affected the PLO8217;s and the Palestinian Authority8217;s cohesion. Important Arab countries such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia continue to give general support to Arafat, the impression among Arabs living in Israel is that Syria and other Arab countries of the Maghreb are losing interest. There is a feeling that a majority of Palestinian Arabs scattered in different parts of the world do not wish to return to any Palestinian homeland proximate to Israel. Another crucial external factor is Israel and Syria normalising relations. The prospects for this seem distant.

The growing frustration among Palestinians in Israel can generate a cycle of violence whose ripple effect can be tense relationships between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Shimon Peres told me that the only way to break this stalemate is to create an independent Palestinian state in some relevant portions of the old Palestine, with all the attributes of sovereignty. He added that Palestinian Arabs must first agree to abjure a militarisation of their state, while Israel should concede all other political and economic power to such a state. But he said even this was not a practical possibility given Israeli paranoia and the current attitude of even his own Labour Party.The challenge for India is to sustain a balanced relationship with all parties in a way responsive to its interests. At the same time it must encourage them to compromise and abjure the confrontations which have emerged since 1996.