
All sorts of inferences should not be drawn from General V. P. Malik8217;s rather open-ended remark at his first Press conference about the need to look beyond Kargil. Judging by the context, it probably refers to the need for vigilance along the entire Line of Control LoC and international border and long-term measures to secure them against surprise intrusions.
As far as crossing the LoC is concerned, the army chief made it crystal clear that is, as it should be, a political decision not a military one. Since there are regular consultations between the cabinet and chiefs of the three armed forces on the military operations, the chances of misunderstandings are obviated. The army has taken the correct position of neither pressing in public for a reversal of the government8217;s policy of restraint nor foreclosing entirely military action across the line. All options should be kept open.
The issue of crossing the line presents the government with a difficult dilemma. Restraint is justified and essential. It has succeeded so far in keeping the conflict localised and winning India international diplomatic support. Those are valuable gains but it is obvious things could change quite easily if Indian military action is carried out on the other side.
The G-8 has been calling for the withdrawal of the intruders in the same breath as they have called for restraint. Any unilateral Indian action will be presumed to increase tensions and will risk an adverse international reaction at a juncture when the screws may be tightening on Pakistan by, among other things, withholding international economic aid.
Further, Pakistan has made it only too clear it is waiting to exploit any opportunity to reverse its diplomatic fortunes. The possibility of Pakistan actually baiting Indian forces, provoking action or opening a wider front should not be ignored. At the same time, the Indian army8217;s hands should not be tied as it battles in harsh terrain. Nor should the adversary be given the assurance of unfettered supply lines. Tactically, creating a certain degree of uncertainty about whether or not the line will be crossed increases the pressure on the G-8 to act and on Pakistan to restrain itself.
The External Affairs Ministry and General Malik may have had just this in mind when citing the 8220;supreme national interest8221; as the decisive factor in a decision.
In this hire-wire balancing act, the government should be wary of making too much of a to-do about crossing the LoC. It should not be turned into a Rubicon crossing which implies that any kind of action 8212; even limited surgical strikes at supply lines 8212; constitutes a major break with the policy of restraint. That would invite universal trouble and put more constraints on the army than strictly necessary. It surely helps to keep the adversary off balance while waiting for international pressure to work.
Other trouble is brewing on the domestic front. The government should not let itself be swayed by war-mongerers whose numbers increase with all the talk of giving Pakistan a bloody nose.
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