US, India aur Woh

There was some irrational gloating in India when Musharraf did not get the F-16s from the United States. The general assessment here was tha...

There was some irrational gloating in India when Musharraf did not get the F-16s from the United States. The general assessment here was that the general8217;s visit to Washington was only a partial success. Wishful thinking is all very well but some clinical objectivity should underpin our assessments about US-Pak relations and our prognosis about their impact on Indo-Pak relations.

First, we must look at the kind of Pakistan Musharraf represented in Washington. Though domestic politics in Pakistan is subject to the tensions spawned by the reduced role of the major political parties as well as the fundamentalist Islamic undercurrents, Musharraf has put in place elected governments both in the provinces and at the Centre. His continuance as the chief of army staff indicates he still has overall support from the Pakistani military establishment. He has consolidated his position in the power structure, a fact acknowledged by the international community. More importantly, the US and other major powers consider him a factor in preventing extremist religious forces from taking over Pakistan.

US-Pak relations are on a rising curve. Between 1999 to 2002, Pakistan has received economic and military assistance to the value of 2.5 to three billion US dollars. The Bush administration not only accepts but confirms that General Musharraf and his government are a valuable ally of the US in its campaign against international terrorism. Musharraf8217;s prompt and positive response to the US request for Pakistani troops for Iraq has strengthened this perception of Pakistan in the Bush administration.

The atmospherics of Musharraf8217;s visit to Washington are a response to the above phenomenon. Substantively, US and Pakistan signed agreements on trade and investment and on scientific and technological cooperation. The US has announced a package of 3 billion in economic and military assistance, to be disbursed over five years. The general impression is that the US is putting in place a pattern of bilateral relations with Pakistan more or less on the lines on which these relations have been structured between the US and India over the last six years. Musharraf also took full advantage of his visit to project Pakistan8217;s positive relationship with the US in the US media. If the aim of his visit was, as the spokesperson of the Pakistan delegation asserted, to deepen US-Pak relations, detaching them from the geo-political volatilities in South Asia, it has succeeded.

The impact of the Musharraf-Bush meetings must be assessed in an India-specific context. Musharraf8217;s visit took place after Vajpayee8217;s initiative for resuming dialogue with Pakistan. India8217;s concerns about cross border terrorism were clearly articulated in the exchanges between Indian and American leaders that preceded the general8217;s trip to Washington. Bush had assured Indian leaders that he will strongly advise President Musharraf to fall in line with the international campaign against terrorism, including against terrorist activities in India. The US seems to have delivered on this promise to the extent it could.

In his public pronouncements en route to Washington Musharraf disclaimed any responsibility for terrorism in J038;K, reiterated Pakistan8217;s political support for the separatist movement in Kashmir, complained that the Indian government has not followed up Vajpayee8217;s initiative with purpose and speed. He speculated that if the Kashmir problem is not resolved, more occurrences like Kargil cannot be ruled out.

Interestingly, there was no comment on these pronouncements by US officials. The US, however, generated some pressure on Pakistan and sent some stern signals. The F-16 planes were denied to Pakistan. Bush also insisted on three conditionalities along with US assistance to Pakistan. One, Musharraf should remain committed to fight terrorism and terrorism is unacceptable in any part of the world. Two, Musharraf should move towards restoring democracy in Pakistan. Three, he should stop sale of nuclear material to 8216;8216;rogue nations8217;8217;.

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It was during US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage8217;s meeting with the general that he was given details of Pak-sponsored terrorism in J038;K and asked to desist. He was also told that the anti-terrorist campaign is not limited to Al Qaeda, it also targets the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed 8212; organisations primarily involved in terrorism in J038;K.

That the advice was not limited to confidential exchanges was a positive development. Also, as Musharraf8217;s visit was coming to an end, some Pakistanis were arrested in the US on charges of conspiring to organise terrorist activities in J038;K. US officials clarified that this was a specific response to Indian advocacies. The chargesheet specifically mentions that their activities aimed at violence and subversion in J038;K.

Having done all this, US officials acknowledge that it is not easy to assess whether Musharaf will move Pakistan in the right direction in dealing with terrorism against India. Their assessment is that out of the three conditions, Musharraf will remain ambiguous about restoring democracy and stopping support to anti-India terrorism. The only point on which he may tactically deliver is on falling back from nuclear and missile cooperation with North Korea. It should also be noted that the US has sought to assure India that Indo-US relations remain on an even keel. Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal was invited to Washington immediately after Musharraf8217;s visit. And US officials had indicated that despite Indian reservations about responding to US requests for Indian troops in Iraq, Indo-US relations will not be affected in fundamental terms.

While Indo-US relations have gained substance and stability, US8217;s South Asia policy still attempts a balance between India and Pakistan, and Pakistan is still considered a more reliable and active ally. India should not complain about this but strengthen its relations with the US instead. Ultimately, the inner contradictions and inadequacies of the Pakistani political system will make the US move away from its balancing act.