Towards the deal, with dignity

There remain several issues of concern which must be subjected to hard-headed negotiation in the future. But it is fundamental to remember that India will only be bound by what it signs and India will sign only that which it agrees to be bound by. Between now and the signing of the proposed 123 Agreement, we can seek a change in the US law if we find any irreconcilable differences.

8226; Conclusion 6: US constitutional law teaches us that large parts of US legislation are merely advisory and non binding; Iran, NPT, CTBT etc. all fall in that part and despite the highest US quarters clarifying the hortatory nature of such provisions of the Hyde Act, it is strange that Indian critics keep harping on them!

8226; Conclusion 7: We have the full right to walk away from the 123 agreement till the last stage of signing it if we find our concerns not being addressed.

Let us examine some of the major legitimate concerns. The first is that US policy does not permit us the right to reprocess spent nuclear fuel of US origin. This is important. Tarapur, a plant set up with US assistance and using US fuel, has growing stockpiles of spent nuclear fuel which US neither takes back nor allows us to reprocess. A careful look at the Hyde Act shows that the legislation, in fact, nowhere prohibits us in any manner from reprocessing spent US fuel. So under the US law, reflected in the 1954 US Atomic Energy Act, as amended by the recent Hyde Act, we can and should be permitted to reprocess US fuel. Only three entities in the world have received a permanent US waiver for reprocessing viz. Japan, Switzerland and the European Union which has Euratom. There is no reason as to why India should not negotiate and push hard for a similar permanent waiver to be included in our proposed 123 agreement. We have a strong and valid case to argue and can contend that we cannot allow indefinitely growing stockpiles either at Tarapore or elsewhere without the power of either reprocessing or returning back or re-exporting.

8226; Conclusion 8: On the US prohibition upon use of spent fuel, we have a good case to get an India specific waiver and should seek it before signing the 123 Agreement.

Let us examine the second issue of concern 8212; that we are prohibited permanently in future from testing any nuclear device. A little knowledge of history is necessary here. India first exploded a nuclear device during Indira Gandhi8217;s prime ministership way back in 1974. In 1998, within a few weeks of assuming office, the Vajpayee Government was able to detonate a bomb because of the readiness of the previous Congress Government which was fully empowered to do so, but had voluntarily chosen not to. Suddenly, after exploding a device in 1998, the Vajpayee Government, without any parliamentary sanction, without any law on the subject and without taking the nation into confidence, suo motu, made a statement unilaterally and voluntarily imposing a moratorium against nuclear testing in perpetuity. At the UN General Assembly on September 24, 1998, he not only repeated his unilateral moratorium but declared India8217;s willingness to be bound by the basic obligations of the CTBT. One year later, Jaswant Singh, the then foreign minister, repeated the essence of Vajpayee8217;s statement in the UNGA.

A crucial point emerging from this is that India already stands committed, by a unilateral declaration, repeatedly reiterated, that it will follow a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing in perpetuity. On this basis, the US would be not entirely unjustified in seeking to incorporate this self-imposed limitation in the proposed 123 Agreement. However, it is to the credit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his government that they have repeatedly declared that while India is free to act as per India8217;s own declared policy, India would not be prepared to accept this moratorium on nuclear testing as a binding legal obligation. I find a supreme irony here. Those who are criticising the deal from the roof tops are the ones who committed India to a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing.

8226; Conclusion 9: India has repeatedly declared its intent not to allow a ban on nuclear testing as part of a binding, legal 123 agreement; as far as India8217;s own unilateral moratorium on such testing is concerned, we have only the present day critics to thank for it.

There is the third issue arising from US policy that does not permit the transfer of equipment for reprocessing and for enriching purposes, without exception.

The first process of the three stage integrated nuclear cycle involves use of uranium in nuclear reactors for creation of nuclear energy. The second reprocesses spent fuel and converts it into plutonium which can be used for further energy production the third which would enable India to use its thorium reserves to generate power is still at the conception stage and far from actualisation. The present day reality is that we are anyway not receiving any such equipment from the US or from any other country in the world. But there is no reason why this should also not be taken up strongly in the future negotiations of the 123 agreement given India8217;s role as a responsible de facto nuclear power for several decades.

8226; Conclusion 10: Although it is going to be tough to get the US to agree to another India specific waiver regarding its global ban on export of reprocessing equipment, India should bring this to the negotiating table.

The July 18, 2005 and March 2006 declarations, the PM8217;s statement on August 17, 2006, the foreign minister8217;s statement on September 12, 2006 in Parliament as also the US legislation and the Joint Statement of the Conference Committee of both the Houses of the US legislature, all reflect the encomiums heaped on India for its exceptional sense of responsibility as a nuclear entity. The Hyde Act and the Joint Minutes of both Houses of Congress talk of India being the pillar for security and stability in South Asia; of global Indo-US partnership on the basis that India is an open democracy with a rapidly growing economy. It emphasises India8217;s pluralism, multi-religious and multi-ethnic profile.

Lastly, one should not forget that nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and eradication of weapons of mass destruction WMD have been a pivotal limb of India8217;s foreign policy. India first gave the call for a ban on nuclear testing in 1954 and sought a global treaty in 1965. In 1978, India propagated the National Convention to prohibit use of nuclear weapons and in 1982 it called for a nuclear freeze. In 1988, then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi delineated a detailed nuclear disarmament action plan in the UNGA. It is in this context that directives like 8220;no first use8221; and the 8220;use of minimum credible force as deterrent8221; were adumbrated.

8226; Conclusion 11: The US legislation and the proposed 123 agreement is a recognition of India8217;s coming of age 8212; and the conferring upon it of a unique status unparalleled globally.

As we progress towards a possible 123 treaty, we should be proud that we do so from a position of strength and dignity. When India has consistently followed its own independent foreign policy, it is hardly fair to treat the proposed 123 agreement as the reflection of US dictation to India qua Iran. Let us be careful that we do not criticise out of habit an agreement not yet born, sealed, signed or delivered. Palmerston said 8220;There are no eternal friends and there are no eternal enemies. There are only eternal interests8221;. National interest must be eternal. It would less than fair if Parliament and this nation do not have implicit confidence in the sincerity and patriotism of this prime minister.

8212;Concluded
The writer is an MP and national spokesperson of the Congress party