Towards a safer world

The proliferation mess that Pakistan finds itself in has re-emphasised the urgency of controlling the spread of nuclear weapons technology. Non-proliferation regimes were tightened substantively in the nineties after Iraq8217;s invasion of Kuwait and the discovery of its clandestine programme. But it is clear that they have been inadequate as much as the Non Proliferation Treaty has been irrelevant in addressing the problem. The inability or unwillingness of Washington to punish Pakistan at this stage only adds to the difficulties of dealing with the future spread of nuclear weapons technology, particularly to non-state actors, which presents unprecedented challenges since traditional deterrence is unlikely to work. George Bush8217;s seven-point plan to control nuclear proliferation in future, although spelt out only in terms of broad principles, is timely. Much of its future would depend upon the fine print and how the broad picture is translated into action.

We in this country need to examine these ideas objectively, detached from the Pakistan factor and/or ideological baggage, and try to shape the debate and an outcome that protects our core interests. Bush8217;s call for a UN Security Council resolution requiring all states to treat proliferation as a criminal activity appears useful, but would depend greatly on how proliferation is defined and what steps are taken in case of violations. Similarly, much would depend on how the proposal to ban new countries from having the ability to enrich or process nuclear materials evolves. This concept seems to have evolved from the earlier idea of stopping future production of nuclear materials for making weapons 8212; a proposal sponsored jointly by the US and India and adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly in December 1993. Unfortunately, negotiations on this treaty have been moribund because of US-China disagreements.

But what would be of crucial importance to India would be the item seeking to prohibit the import of equipment and technology for civilian nuclear power programmes by countries unless they sign the Additional Protocol on sageguards which requires all nuclear facilities to be placed under a highly intrusive international inspection regime. This ban is de-facto operative against us and we are already hampered in our socio-economic development by its being in place since 1992. However the recent US-India bilateral agreement, often described as the 8220;Glide Path8221; announced last month, promises to facilitate our access to nuclear power material and technology. The assumption in the public domain is that this would require steps by India like tighter export controls, and so on, but short of giving up its nuclear weapons programme so vital for national security. Overall, the Bush initiative presents both a challenge and opportunity for our diplomacy.