Three cheers for bus diplomacy

For nearly a decade I was involved in talks and negotiations with Pak authorities on the resolution of defence related issues 8212; post-Exercise Brasstacks, intrusions into Jamp;K across theLoC, Siachen, et all.

De-escalating the high tension after Brasstacks was not easy. The first round of Indo-Pak talks in Delhi failed, despite the Indian PM offering a no war pact8217;. However, we succeeded in the next round in Islamabad. In summer 1989, in Islamabad, we came very near settling many problems.

However, the Pak PM wished that the outcome of our talks be not disclosed by officials on either side as she was in direct contact with the Indian PM and would soon decide when and how the understandings should be made public.

Tragically, this never happened. Obviously, the military and the ISI had succeeded in not losing their ground as, soon thereafter, the Pak Army launched their biggest ever exercise, the Zar-be-Momin, wh-ich was quite apparently a rejoinder to Brass-tacks. This prolonged exercise concluded in massive infiltration of trained militants into Jamp;K. From January 19-90 onwards there was progressive increase in terrorist activity in the Valley, soon to spread south of the Banihal andlater to Doda and neighbouring Himachal Pradesh.

Ironically, the bilateral dialogue continued. Pakistan accepted our suggestion that there should be a hot line between the Director Generals of Military Operations DGMOs on both sides. This mechanism of regular talks between the two officers initially yielded some results and for several weeks both sides implemented their agreement that neither army would resort to heavy fire mortar and artillery.

In the Siachen talks, held in Delhi in late 1992, we achieved the unexpected 8212; both sides agreed to a pullout, declaring the glacier arena a demilitarised zone and setting up a system of aerial inspections to ensure adherence. Late in the night before the agreement was to be signed I reported the outcome to the PM and was advised that the signing ceremony could be deferred to the next round in Islamabad, in early 1993. That day never came.

With the passage of time, and enhanced objectivity, India could be held accountable for not having seized arisingopportunities. It would also need to be noted that for over two decades the Pak leadership missed no opportunity of denigrating India in the vilest terms and indulging in sustained inflammatory rhetoric in every possible forum, at home and abroad.

The younger generation of Pakistan have been brought up to believe that India is their only enemy. The proxy war in Jamp;K has not yielded the results Pakistan had envisaged and the world at large has got fed up with the Pak cacophony against India. Pakistan faces serious social, political and financial problems. Realisation appears to have dawned that the country8217;s domestic affairs cannot be managed alongside the continuation of a confrontationist policy against India.

India also faces serious problems on several fronts 8212; managing the aftermath of the nuclear tests and finding the resources for sustained socio-economic development. There is no scope for any significant increase in allocations for defence spending.

Whatever be the relative merits of thepositions taken by the two countries in the past five decades, sanity lies in moving speedily towards rapprochement and opening up meaningful trade, business and other linkages. Once the temperatures are adequately lowered the resolution of the larger problems can also be found.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif deserves high praise for having mustered courage to invite Vajpayee to visit Lahore and the latter for having so promptly accepted the offer. It would be too much to expect that their forthcoming meeting will lead to the elimination of all the ills which have long plagued Indo-Pak relations.

However, if both PMs, and those assisting them in their talks, display trust and positivity the projected dialogue between the two leaders can result in appropriate understandings for managing the nuclear glow, which is most urgently essential, and laying the basis of meaningful further progress. For the latter to be achieved the two PMs shall have to be most astute in deciding the levels and modalities of the nextsteps. There is potential of success if the further dialogue is at the level of envoys nominated by the two PMs.

The Indian PM8217;s willingness to travel by bus to Lahore, even for a short distance before the security squads whisk him away, may not be viewed as a comic event. Protocol and Anglo-Saxon notions of propriety are irrelevant in the Indo-Pak setting. Who knows, this fortuitously engendered meeting may achieve what over five decades of traditional diplomacy failed to do. For the moment, three cheers for busomacy!