These boots are for walking

Be that as it may, all coups, including the well-intentioned, subvert the principal-agent framework. The coup-maker argues that he is temporarily violating the second order of agency from the collection to the government machinery to protect the first from the individual to the collective. The argument is premised on the claim that the civilian leadership has violated the first order of agency and repairing that primary relationship demands that the secondary administrative relationship must be broken as well.

The subversion of the principle-agent framework is a structural problem that is a constant regardless of what theoretical design one might use to try and understand the nature of military interventions 8212; whether in general terms or in specific cases.

It has consequences, the first being that by breaking the order of agency the coup also subverts the legal-normative framework so essential to the 8220;art of associating8221; which underpins all social, political and economic activity. Being an external actor using its monopoly of the state8217;s coercive apparatus 8212; even when the coups are bloodless, the gun is never far from one8217;s temple 8212; the military thus undermines the constitutional arrangements.

What happens next is both instructive and ironic. If the coup-maker means well, he gets down to his reform agenda. He banishes some politicians, bans some political parties, begins a process of accountability to cleanse the system, stresses economic progress over messy political activity and takes a slew of measures to depoliticise the polity.

This works for some time. But at some point on the curve the coup-maker realises that he needs to co-opt, in addition to the civil bureaucracy, amenable political actors. The decision kicks off controlled political activity which by its very logic leads to elections and a return to legislative assemblies. A hybrid, quasi-civilian system is put in place.

The coup-maker, however, wants to stay above the clang-tint of politics. That8217;s wishful thinking because the very move towards controlled political activity signals the limits on his power to rule through diktat and on the back solely of the military.

The decision begins the process of politicisation of the polity again. But the process remains bereft of an endogenous norm that has already been broken by the coup-maker. The art of associating, instead of aggregating interests, becomes a dangerous game of one-upmanship. In the middle of all this, having let the furies out, the coup-maker tries increasingly desperately to stay above the institutions. There is a dream to be fulfilled and while it is important to institutionalise, it is vital for the visionary to stay above the fray, above the institutions.

But institutions, once in place and allowed to work 8212; even while being monitored and controlled 8212; acquire their own dynamic. Impersonal, they can work against anyone; when a person in high office allows institutional power to dilute his authority, he helps the norm to grow and become strong.

That8217;s the lifeblood of a normal system. Not so for the coup-maker. If he lets the chief justice of the apex court function unimpeded, he can be certain that some of the decisions will go against him. The vision demands that the coup-maker8217;s authority remain unfettered. Institutions demand that he submit to the legal-normative framework just like everyone else. This is the point of conflict.

It is also the reason for the current crisis in Pakistan. General Musharraf is not stupid; he is merely constrained by the very structures of his own system. If he lets the chief justice and the prime minister work and stay within the confines of the constitution himself, he will lose his primacy and with it his ability to get things done. At the military academy, his platoon commander wouldn8217;t listen to excuses: a task assigned has to be completed, no matter what.

So, Musharraf, while stressing the importance of institutions, needs to stay above them. Democratic consensus is a pot-bellied, slow-moving elderly man. Musharraf wants to streamline internal and external affairs and he is in a hurry. He also realises that the incumbency factor has set in. Everyone wants him to doff his uniform. But uniform is his real power-base because it links him with, and gives him the command of, his constituency. He cannot allow the CJ to deprive him of that or question him on the good work he is doing in Balochistan just because a few people have been made to disappear; worse, read him the riot act on human rights.

All of this may be standard fare for normal times but Pakistan is passing through extraordinary times. Musharraf cannot allow legalities to sabotage the good end he has in mind, and as a coup-maker he knows that end justifies the means. This is why he cannot make a compromise and suffer the two 8220;weaknesses8221; built into it: give a timeframe and share power. Musharraf cannot give a timeframe on his departure and he cannot share power because that would keep him from doing what he wants.

The situation presents a conflict between people8217;s demand for freedom, a basic right with intrinsic value, and Musharraf8217;s vision. And this conflict manifests itself in Musharraf8217;s battle against institutions. Courts have to be leashed; the media have to be monitored. Freedoms were granted but their exercise should have excluded Musharraf and his agenda.

While the coming days will see Musharraf try to extricate from the current bind, and he may effect some tactical withdrawals, there will be no strategic retreat. The latter would amount to Musharraf losing his sinews. Were that to happen, he might as well leave the scene.

The writer is op-ed editor, Daily Times, and consulting editor, The Friday Times, Lahore. Views are his own