
A war that has been debated for months, very often with great emotion and rhetoric, by the great powers and the international community has finally been launched. The United States, true to its promise, has done so unilaterally and without the specific mandate of the UN.
The declared US aims of the war against Saddam Hussein8217;s Iraq have shifted over this period from regime change, to disarmament, and now back to regime change; but leaning heavily toward invoking the self-defence rationale in stating that Iraq poses a direct threat to American security.
In many ways, this is a defining moment for the international community. But it would be well to remember at this stage that only a minuscule number of more than 300 wars since 1945 have carried a UN mandate. Meanwhile, the aspect that demands urgent attention is how is this war likely to proceed.
The US-UK forces have launched a co-ordinated air and ground attack on Iraq from its launch positions in Kuwait. Two objectives seem to stand out in the air offensive: That of locating and hitting Saddam Hussein and of generating strategic paralysis of Iraq by a massive demonstration and use of awesome force with high-technology weapons.
Both would apply strong pressure for the collapse of Iraqi military opposition and through that ensure the early success of the ground offensive. In addition, US would rely heavily on information warfare, well beyond any propaganda or psychological warfare seen in the past. The US has very little international support for this war, unlike the last Gulf War where the issues were more clearly defined and the UN mandate was forthcoming since Saddam Hussein had violated the very basis of the international system by invading and annexing a sovereign state.
In 1991, the overall political-military objective was the liberation of Kuwait, and not the dethronement of Saddam Hussein, or even the destruction of the Iraqi military except where it was directly necessary to the goals of restoring Kuwait8217;s sovereignty and integrity. This time the central target is Saddam Hussein and his regime and, through this, the Iraqi military, particularly the more capable and loyal Republican Guard forces now deployed to defend Baghdad and Saddam Hussein along with his close associates.
US forces would have little difficulty in either by-passing or rolling back the 17-odd Divisions of Iraq8217;s regular army deployed in the outer reaches while the seven Divisions of the Republican Guards hold the Baghdad Core a radius of about 100-km around the capital.
US unmanned air vehicles UAVs, manned aircraft, satellite reconnaissance, electronic intelligence systems and spies have been mapping every bit of that core area for a long time. Locating and hitting Saddam Hussein would naturally be the highest priority since it is likely to lead to an early victory for the US.
The struggle here is obviously a cat-and-mouse battle 8212; a high-technology cat, and a shrewd ingenious mouse that has defied the powerful cat for more than a decade. Now that the full force of US military power has been brought to bear on Iraq, the ultimate defeat of Iraq and Saddam Hussein does not seem to be in doubt.
While many in the world are unhappy with the concept of regime change by force, it is necessary to remember that this has been a stated goal of the US administration and the Congress since the mid-nineties. The Iraq Liberation Act approved by President Bill Clinton in 1999 specifically authorised the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, allocating 97 million for this purpose. A great deal of the policy to bolster an opposition stems from those efforts. But equally important, and unlike the first Gulf War, US intelligence operations since then, and now co-ordinated with Special Operations Forces including the famous British SAS have been deployed inside Iraq for months.
Meanwhile, air strikes over more than two-thirds of Iraqi territory have continued under Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch covering the 8220;no-fly-zones8221; in northern and southern Iraq. These attacks have been intensified during the past four months. The net result has been that, coupled with the UN imposed sanctions, Iraqi military capabilities have been emaciated during the past decade.
While Iraq has an air force in being, its availability for operations is marginal, and influence on the conduct of the war even less so. The only opposition that US air power would have to contend with is the 4,000-strong anti-aircraft artillery, and the over 1,000 surface-to-air missile system of varying quality now mostly deployed in and around Baghdad. Anglo-American air power would, therefore, operate even in daylight against targets in Iraq, but at significantly higher altitudes than even in 1991. This would be made possible by the introduction of precision-guided munitions at a phenomenally larger scale than last time. It is expected that compared to the use of only 5 per cent guided weapons then, precision-guided weapons would constitute closer to 95 per cent of the total used in this war. And the new ones are also much cheaper and less susceptible to counter-measures.
Wars have historically contained many surprises. It is possible that Saddam Hussein could be knocked out rather suddenly, or he may well be at the helm of affairs to give battle to the Anglo-American forces in the streets of Baghdad. But everything today points to the victory of the US. What is under question is the time it may take to get to the end point. The longer it takes, the greater are the chances of anti-American sentiment gaining across the world, and even a backlash in the Muslim world. At the same time, there will also remain the possibility that an internal war develops rapidly between the Ba8217;ath party cadres and the numerous opposition groups in Iraq, not necessarily along the Shia-Sunni or Kurdish-Arab fault-lines. Such a development could lead to unpredictable consequences, where neither Saddam Hussein nor the Anglo-American forces may be able to differentiate between friend and foe.