The new agency

national boundaries, requiring a unified response. Nowhere was this more evident than in the terror attacks on Jaipur, Delhi and Surat last year where rival state police jostled to sing different tunes in what was essentially the same orchestra. If preventing this is the NIA8217;s aim, the act succeeds. But the NIA has been billed as a response to Mumbai; a harbinger of wholesale police reform. In this grander goal, the act falters.

For a start, the act doesn8217;t show us the money. Mumbai8217;s big lesson was that an ill-equipped, under-trained force makes for poor policing. The act doesn8217;t change this. There8217;s no mention of the money and the kind of well-trained professionals required to run this sprawling new bureaucracy. Mumbai also taught us to beware the politicisation of policing. True, the act seeks to redraw the delicate balance between state and Central control over policing, but doesn8217;t tell us how. For instance, the NIA would have to rely on the local police, often coordinating between different state police forces. But how to ensure this? What are the micro lines of control? The act, strong on intent, is silent on these details. May be the argument is that these rules will be thrown up via practice. But more guidelines would have helped, especially given the sometimes fractious Centre-state relations. The act does provide the framework under which the Centre can choose to pump in money, personnel and

co-ordination into terror investigations. But the Centre does this by claiming control, while binding itself to few obligations.

Of course the proof of the act will finally be in action 8212; how

effective the agency set up

under this law is when confronted with a terrorist attack and how

effectively it coordinates with

all other agencies. The stakes

before India8217;s federal anti-terror agency are huge.