The K-deal

Pakistan8217;s strategic and economic problems and the challenges to its internal cohesion are too complex and scary to be described in one article, and that is not my purpose either. This is no time to rejoice over Pakistan8217;s plight. My point is, in fact, the opposite. In this rapidly changing world, the last thing India needs is a beggar-my-neighbour mindset. As Vajpayee said repeatedly to justify his many peace moves with Pakistan in spite of failure and disappointment, you can8217;t choose your neighbours. And if the neighbours you have been blessed with get into a real mess, or become a problem for you, you cannot wish them away either. Surely, we are not responsible for Pakistan acquiring nuclear weapons, or investing in such an elaborate infrastructure of jihad and cross-border terrorism over two decades. They did it on their own volition, and with some help from the Americans in the era of the first, and 8220;virtuous8221;, Afghan jihad against the Soviets. But what are the consequences for us now if Pakistan slips into confusion and anarchy, or if its very proud people, who have tasted spells of democracy and are now chafing at the loss of sovereignty, took to the streets in anger?

Or, look at it another way. Our negotiations with Pakistan on settling the Kashmir issue okay, as a part of the composite dialogue have now been stalled for more than two years, and for good reason. Initially, these were put in abeyance because of Musharraf8217;s weakened position. Obviously, two nations cannot settle a historic dispute of such complexity when the leader of one is serving on borrowed time. But even now negotiations are refusing to get off the ground because nobody really knows who wields real power in Pakistan and, more importantly, whose word is going to count for posterity should a settlement be reached eventually. Even if the army kept out of it, and gave the political government space, the current arrangement there does not have the strength and credibility to encourage India to move decisively towards a settlement.

If we were still living in old times, this would have suited us fine. India8217;s Kashmir strategy, over nearly five decades, was to just stall all movement on Kashmir and wait for time to somehow sort out the problem, or at least blunt its edges. That strategy worked to an extent. Over the decades, the Security Council resolutions have become so obsolete that even successive secretary-generals have refused to bother mentioning them, and now Pakistani leaders also do not make chest-thumping public declarations to stand by them. Musharraf8217;s brilliant self-goal on Kargil, and then the at least half-successful coercive diplomacy of the NDA government, further ensured that the sanctity of the Line of Control acquired global acceptance. That done, India8217;s key objectives on Kashmir have been achieved. What is now needed is a settlement with Pakistan that saves the face of all three sides, India, Pakistan and the Kashmiris, without any cartographic alterations. But can India go ahead and make that settlement with a head of state who complains to the BBC that he has no technology to shoot down the killer drones sent into his territory by his closest ally? But, at the same time, can India let this drift for ever?

Do we remember which foreign head of state was the first to acknowledge the sanctity of the LoC and when? Who first said lines on the region8217;s map can no longer be redrawn in blood? Where did he say it and what was the context? It was, indeed, Bill Clinton, on his very brief, stern, finger-wagging stopover in Pakistan on his way back from India in March 2000.

It is important to recall that, because even a suggestion by Obama in a Time magazine interview that he may appoint a special envoy for Kashmir 8212; and that envoy could even be Bill Clinton 8212; has led to murmurs of concern in our ever-suspicious strategic-intellectual establishment. Reacting in a prickly manner to any suggestion of 8220;third-party intervention8221; in what we see as a purely bilateral issue is a basic instinct with this establishment. But it is about time we questioned ourselves as to whether that inherited wisdom is valid for ever. Such vanilla bilateralism on Kashmir was crucial when we had issues with the world, when we had to presume that any outsider might be inclined towards the Pakistani view. Now, with the whole world acknowledging the LoC and nobody raising the Security Council resolutions, the picture looks different.

Also, bilateralism on an issue of such historical complexity can probably work between two equally stable, constitutional states. Not when one continues to be politically unstable, and where new incumbents sometimes bring their own constitutions. They then find it easy to even repudiate sovereign agreements reached by their predecessors. Who, in any case, would feel morally obliged to honour commitments made by somebody they either killed, jailed, or exiled on their ascent to power? Democracy in Pakistan has taken a giant step with the peaceful removal of Musharraf, but it is still a work in progress. We can8217;t wait for that process to be completed. That is why we probably need a little bit of the foreign hand here. A path-breaking settlement with Pakistan over Kashmir will look better, more durable and credible if it is backed by some kind of international participation and legitimacy. It will be tough for future regimes in Pakistan to go back on it, the way some in the past junked the Shimla Accord and the Lahore Declaration. That is why, if Obama shows early enthusiasm on Kashmir, and even appoints a special envoy, we do not have to rush for the trenches as in the past 8212; particularly if the envoy is the man who first said the map of the subcontinent can no longer be redrawn with blood.

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