The democratic dream remains

It is a different matter that they squandered the opportunity to reshape Pakistan, to break the stranglehold of the military-bureaucratic regime, and to create a multi-party system that would aggregate and synthesise the interests of many diverse groups.Zulfi promised much but delivered little; Benazir8217;s legacy was a country torn apart by provincialism, Shia-Sunni violence, and by growing ethnic strife. When Nawaz Sharif jumped into the fray in 1997, the electorate seemed to be saying to him:

The wind has blown away the dust of men Unnumbered from your lane;

Yet your true lovers are not daunted: men Come to your threshold still.

No wonder he won a landslide victory. Over-whelmed by his popular mandate, he declared his intention to keep faith with the people. But he proved to be a reckless country politician with no sensitivity to even the elementary lessons of governance. At a time when he should have concentrated on economic discontent and a recession unprecedented in Pakistan8217;s history, he chose to go nuclear. Washington responded angrily; Nawaz Sharif lost face with his people. At a time when he should have dealt with growing sectarian/ethnic unrest, he used the rhetoric of Islamisation to buy peace.

If he had read his country8217;s history,he would realised the merit in what Iskander Mirza said not long ago 8212; 8220;We can8217;t run wild on Islam; it is Pakistan first and last.8221;

When Bhutto was caught up in his own quagmire, he resorted to repression. Nawaz Sharif did the same, though at a time when, thanks to the efforts of people like Asma Jahangir, civil liberty as an issue has gained salience in Pakistan society. Beset with internal and external problems, he acted more as a despot than a democratically elected leader. This is probably one of the reasons why, much of the confidence he generated at the time of his election, was dissipated. In a nutshell this has been the fate of all elected governments in Pakistan; their record of governance contributing to their inglorious collapse.

Do we then trace the origin of the present turmoil to the two-nation theory? This standard explanation is unacceptable for the simple reason that Pakistan8217;s civilian and military rulers have not been guided by the contested visions of Iqbal, Jinnah, or the Jamaat-iIslami chief Ma-dudi. Yes, the arenas of conflict and strife have enlarged over the last five decades. But the explanation lies not in any serious ideological stirring in Pakistan, but in the abysmal failure of the State to pay adequate attention to illiteracy, social empowerment, and regional economic disparities.

Today, the central issue is the intense struggle and competition to access scarce resources, rather than an imaginary ideological contest, say between the Pakistan8217;s People8217;s Party and the Jamaat-i Islami, taking place in civil society. This is what the Muhajir-Sindhi conflict is all about. On the other hand, if the Jamaat8217;s dismal electoral showing is any indication, then the signs are that the bulk of the electorate has shed its Islamic cloak and opted for a secular not the Nehruvian kind and democratic polity. It would be a mistake to ignore this important consensus emerging in Pakistan, or to rule out the prospect of yet another campaign for the restoration of democracy.

Pakistanis, thehistorian Ayesha Jalal reminds us, have the 8220;state8221; if not quite the 8220;nation8221; of their collective imaginings. The real problem, according to her, is that those wielding despotic power in the name of Islam have done precious little for the principles of equality, solidarity, or freedom. She emphasises, moreover, the absence of sustained debate on citizenship rights, not just political but also social and economic, that has hindered the growth of civil society and the creation of a collective ethos as a nation-state.

Added to this is the absence of a social coalition of the three main segments the underprivileged, the middle class and the elite. For this, the ruling elites must share the blame. They have left the Pakistani ship adrift in turbulent waters. For decades they have consolidated their own gains, leaving the common man on the streets of Karachi or Lahore await the realisation of the promises made by Bhutto8217;s election manifesto of 1970. My final point is simple enough. The endurance of thelong-standing tie-up between the military and the bureaucracy is at the heart of the present and previous crises in Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif did not try to break loose; instead, he systematically subverted established political institutions. He tried taking on the army, but came a cropper. In the end, he was consumed by his overweening ambition. Meanwhile the common man may have to wait long enough for the fulfilment of his dream.

As Mir Taqi Mir wrote: Have you not heard what happened to Mansur?/Here, if you speak the truth, they crucify you.