Technically speaking8230;

A useful principle to keep in mind in matters of this kind is the one that Eugene R. Black, the then president of the World Bank, had highlighted during negotiations over the Indus Water Treaty. 8220;There is,8221; he noted, 8220;a need to treat water development as a common project that is functional, and not political, in nature8230; undertaken separately from the political issues with which India and Pakistan are confronted.8221; He believed that the Indus dispute could most realistically be solved if the functional aspects of the disagreement were negotiated apart from political considerations, with the question of utilising the waters of the Indus Basin considered without the accompanying baggage of historic rights or allocations. Today, there is a need to abide by that useful separation. Pakistan8217;s response to the Baglihar project issue appears to be dictated by its political phobias and general distrust of India8217;s intentions. It believes that the 450 MW-hydel project on the Chenab would affect flows into Pakistan and voices the concern that India could use the dam to cause droughts or floods on its side of the Punjab. This, of course, has no relation with reality. On the contrary, despite the innumerable tensions that have marked Indo-Pak relations, the Indus Water Treaty has continued to govern riparian matters between the two countries.

Even now it is not too late to apply Black8217;s formula of separating the political from the functional to this vexed issue. For instance, perhaps the two countries can consider setting up a joint commission of engineers and technical staff to take a good look at a project which will be of great benefit to the power-starved citizens of J038;K and evolve a way out of the current impasse. And, who knows, perhaps such a process will also throw up a replicable model for solving problems of this kind which are constantly bedevilling relations between New Delhi and Islamabad.