Some unpalatable answers

The crisis of law, constitution and political system: I say Pakistan must revamp the political system and revise the constitution sothat they serve the people below instead of the corrupt elites above.

The crisis of the economy: I say that Pakistan should honour its international contracts, enforce domestic loan repayments, tax the rich, dispossess the corrupt, live within its means, vitalise its human resources, export the value of its scientific talent, establish and enforce a genuine private-public partnership in which the private sector produces efficiently and the public sector regulates effectively.

The crisis of civil society: I say enforce the rule of law, disarm society, disband militias, decentralise decision-making and power, establish accountability, protect minorities and women, create social security nets and provide decentralised and quick justice.

The crisis of foreign policy: I say make friends, not masters or enemies, bury Cold War hatchets, renounce post-Cold War jihads, negotiate terms of trade, not territorial ambitions, redefine strategic depth to mean emphasis on internal will rather than externalspace.

The crisis of national security: I say redefine security to mean not only military defense but also economic vitality, social cohesion and international respect. And I say that Pakistan should determine its minimal optimal defence deterrent but shun an arms race.

The answer to the second question 8212; who will implement this agenda 8212; is difficult only for one reason: I cannot see a single leader or institution that can personify national power and has the three virtues required to get Pakistan out of this mess. These are the vision to chart a course, the courage to implement it ruthlessly and the integrity to ensure that it doesn8217;t get derailed. My hope is that such leadership will develop in the time to come. My fear is that if this doesn8217;t happen soon enough, it may be too late.

I would now like to turn briefly to one factor that impinges greatly on Pakistan8217;s past, present and future, one which should concern all of you who are assembled here today 8212; Pakistan8217;s relationship with India. In onecrucial sense, India remains a determining factor vis-a-vis Pakistan. The Pakistani state has come to be fashioned largely in response to perceived and propagated, real and imagined threats to its national security from India.

Its mentality and outlook are therefore that of a historically besieged state. That is why conceptions of national security, defined in conventional military terms, dominate its thinking. Indeed, that is why the state8217;s outlook dominates government policy. That is why Pakistan8217;s foreign policy runs its domestic policy rather than the other way round. That is why Pakistan8217;s economy is hostage to Pakistan8217;s Cold War conceptions of national security. That is why Pakistan is more a state-nation than a nation-state.

This is responsible for the lack of development of a sustainable and stable democratic political culture. Indeed, it has spawned extra-state institutions espousing Islamic fundamentalism and jehad. It is these forces which are undermining the compact between the state andpeople of Pakistan, adversely affecting political discourse.

Pakistan8217;s obsession with India hurts it deeply. But the roots of this obsession cannot be shrugged away by India. Indeed, India may be said to be the root cause of Pakistan8217;s insecurity. Apart from pre-Partition history, there is a great injustice done to Pakistan by India over Kashmir and the dismemberment of Pakistan, in which India played a critical and leading role. So one of the fallouts of this obsession is the decade-long low-intensity conflict in Kashmir. Another is Pakistan8217;s tit-for-tat nuclear and missile tests and its refusal to sign a no-first-strike agreement with India, which in turn means that Pakistan cannot get a no-war commitment from India.

In this way, if Pakistan8217;s past is umbilically linked to that of India, its future cannot but be shaped by India8217;s future, as well as have an impact on it. If the rise of fundamentalist Islam threatens Pakistan8217;s body politic, India cannot expect to escape its negative fallout. If anuclear arsenal is assembled in Pakistan, India8217;s security cannot be vouchsafed by all the nuclear weapons at its disposal.

If Pakistan fails as a nation-state and becomes a rogue regime, India8217;s Army will not be able to contain its disruptive and destabilising impact. If Pakistan is drawn into an arms race with India, the logic of the situation will fuel the sources of conflict between the two countries rather than provide security to either.

Of course, this does not mean that India should constantly look over its shoulder while determining its own national security policies. But it does mean that India cannot ever be a great power or great nation if its own backyard is seething with resentment and turmoil. As long as India8217;s quest for great powerdom is based on its strategy of military outreach, it is bound to be thwarted in its ambitions by tit-for-tat Pakistan.

India will be recognised as a great power not on the basis of its numerical military superiority in the region but by the extent to whichthe countries of South Asia, including Pakistan, are economically inter-dependent and independent of the superpowers. India should make enduring peace with Pakistan on principled and honourable terms and resolve the Kashmir dispute, thereby helping the forces of civil society in Pakistan to fashion a new state which is subservient to the Pakistani nation instead of the other way round.

In conclusion, I would like to remind everyone of one lesson of modern history: vibrant and stable democracies are less likely to go to war than authoritarian states which live on the basis of threat of war. Thank you for your patience.