Settling Siachen: Don146;t let the solution become a bigger future problem

Since the 1972 Simla Agreement did not say anything about its extension beyond this point, Karachi Agreement of 1949 is the only valid basis to settle this conflict.

India has made no attempt to move down westward from the peaks of the Saltoro Ridge that it has been holding since April 1984. But Pakistan Army launched a massive attack in September 1987 and failed, suffering heavy casualty.

This has remained a sore point with Pakistani Army leadership since, especially after General Zia ul-Haq denied permission to take the ridge and Siachen glaciers to its east with a strategy of indirect approach8212;the kind put into action by General Pervez Musharraf in Kargil in the summer of 1999.

Attempts were made after 1987 to arrive at a negotiated solution to the 8220;Siachen conflict8221; and talks between Islamabad and New Delhi commenced by 1989. There is widespread understanding that the two countries were very close to an agreement by 1993 but did not move forward to close it.

A major roadblock in the way of a durable solution is that there is no guarantee that the solution will not become a problem one day.

Although the Kargil war no doubt had Siachen as its strategic objective, the reality is that any settlement will have to recognise the Saltoro Ridge as the actual position on the ground for more than two decades and fully consistent with the 1949 Karachi Agreement.

With the ongoing peace process between India and Pakistan, this seems a favourable time for arriving at a solution through negotiations. The problem is with the terms of that solution and disengagement.

Logically, the line on the ridge indicating the actual position on the ground should be treated as an extension of the 1972 Line of Control. But even if we accept the new terminology8212;AGPL Actual Ground Position Line8212; this has to be accorded the requisite degree of sanctity to avoid future conflicts.

Reports indicate that Pakistan does not wish to authenticate the actual positions and will only provide assurance of respecting it.

There is nothing in Pakistan8217;s conduct over the past 59 years that provides even a modicum of confidence in such assurances.

The Siachen conflict itself is a product of its clandestine aggression in violation of the 1949 Karachi Agreement. In case of Kargil, Pakistan claimed the duly authenticated Line of Control was 8220;ambiguous.8221; And Pakistan has not given up its illegal claim over the Siachen region extending into Nubra valley, which should be part of any negotiated settlement.

But the minimum we need is authentication and exchange of maps duly signed by authorised representatives of the two governments. These maps must be made public, nationally and internationally.

Accurate satellite maps of Saltoro Ridge are available.

If Islamabad decides to launch an adventure across the AGPL, the costs will be heavy, in fact, much more than Kargil. The terrain is such that it is easier for Pakistan Army to move up to Saltoro Ridge and occupy areas in Siachen. But the 70-m glacier will make it almost impossible for Indian Army to retake Saltoro Ridge.

Pakistani military leaders know it well and so want to provide the minimum commitment for future restraint.

One of the outcomes of the Kargil war has been to bring in an internationally respected sanctity to the LoC. Even if Pakistan is ready to authenticate the AGPL and make it public, the problem is that this is only an agreed line, indicating the position of troops at a certain time. What if Pakistani Army occupies the vacated posts and areas from which Indian Army would have withdrawn as part of the bilateral agreement?

Throwing out Pakistani Army will require Herculean efforts and incur very high casualty. Opening another front will amount to escalation and even a charge that we are violating the sanctity of the 1972 Line of Control and the international border.

We also need assurance that we can deter violation and take punitive action without incurring unacceptable costs and complications if that deterrence fails.

This will be best carried out through regular aerial surveillance. Force will be used against would-be intruders east of Saltoro Ridge.

Pakistan may not be willing to include such a clause in the agreement, but we should make it clear that we have the right and we would exercise it.

The writer is Director, Centre for Air Power Studies