Rewind to the 146;71 war

As a member of the operational sections of the Military Operations Directorate, dealing with the actual conduct of the war under Lt Gen Inde...

As a member of the operational sections of the Military Operations Directorate, dealing with the actual conduct of the war under Lt Gen Inder Singh Gill 8212; the Director, Military Operations at the time, I feel compelled to respond to some of K Subrahmanyam8217;s inaccurate, far-fetched and hasty conclusions in his article, 8216;8216;A history of intelligence failure8217;8217; June 29, 2005.

Subrahmanyam says he had suggested to the then Finance Minister, Y B Chavan, that the Indian Army 8216;8216;should drive up to the Indus River8217;8217; in the Sind sector. And that Chavan got back to him later and confided that due to paucity of resources with Lt Gen Bewoor, the offensive into Sind was not going to be possible. Chavan is not around any more but could a senior Cabinet minister have discussed and shared operational military plans with a director of a think-tank? And being a civilian, did he know what he was talking about when recommending operational military plans?

On how and why a ceasefire was effected, let me point out that though there was talk of American interest in the matter and the Enterprise episode, with Dacca8217;s imminent fall on the cards, it was considered prudent to wrap up operations at the soonest so that international interests could not intervene to declare Dacca a free city mandated by the United Nations or some other such force. We also wanted to set up the provisional government under Sheikh Mujibar Rehman at the soonest.

Regarding the Chinese 8216;8216;refusing to take American advice and move against India militarily8217;8217;, as someone who commanded a Mountain Division in the North East I can proudly say the Chinese would have received a tough riposte had they intervened in 1971. If China had acted unwisely at that time, the Soviet Union would certainly have made its presence felt. All this is well known to any defence analyst.

Subrahmanyam8217;s suggestion urging an offensive upto Sind with a view to 8216;8216;have an effective say in the post-war government-making in West Pakistan8217;8217; can only be termed preposterous and premature. Did he honestly think that so early into the war he could have predicted a likely Balkanisation of West Pakistan? That too when a major campaign was underway in the East for the creation of Bangladesh. As a security analyst he should understand the complexities of waging wars on two stretched-out Fronts.

Finally, unsolicited advice to Cabinet Ministers and other officials on military and operational matters affecting the security of the nation should be prohibited. We must leave the three Service Chiefs and the Raksha Mantri to do their jobs.

The writer is a retired Major General