
As America8217;s new Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, visits New Delhi, the foreign office might do well to prepare itself for another diplomatic surprise that might just follow as she goes on to Pakistan from here. Remember, the last time her predecessor, Colin Powell, was in the region, he went to announce that Pakistan was to be America8217;s special 8216;Non-NATO Military Ally8217; NMMA. While the cynical view was that it had perhaps slipped the mind of General Powell to announce a similar status for India, the truth is that America had in fact offered India a special alliance in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. But when a leading Indian newsmagazine published this as a cover story to coincide with then prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee8217;s trip to the US in November, the government developed cold feet and denied it all.
But while many of the items on the initial American wish list 8212; including joint training of troops 8212; have since been met, yet Washington8217;s repeated requests for Indian peacekeepers to bail out its soldiers from Iraq have met with a negative response from Delhi, and rightly so. And so, Pakistan8217;s NMMA status followed. Many would however argue that Indo-US relations haven8217;t been as good as they are now for decades. True. However, this has happened essentially for two reasons. One, because India has quite literally blasted itself onto America8217;s radar screens following the Pokharan nuclear tests of 1998. And the other reason is that as Americans essentially think out of their wallets, it is hard to ignore the investment opportunities that India offers. One cannot think of any other good reason that gets Washington to take India seriously. But it still balances its relations with India vis-a-vis Pakistan.
Take for instance, America8217;s decision, post-9/11, to ally itself with Pakistan, even though it was India and not Pakistan that was amongst the first off the blocks to offer assistance to the US in its war against terror. But while Washington chose to use Pakistan 8212; to trounce the Taliban in Afghanistan 8212; for several sensible military reasons, the fact that Pakistan continued to sponsor cross-border terror in India was of little concern to the US. And when India threatened to retaliate 8212; following the massacre at the Kaluchak military base, near Jammu 8212; it was the US that warned India not to attack Pakistan when American troops were on Pakistani soil and when Pakistan had committed three or more army divisions to seal off the Afghan border. No wonder, America8217;s war against terror was only America8217;s war, not that of the world, whatever Washington8217;s assurances.
Furthermore, General Musharraf8217;s pro-peace and anti-terror utterances have earned him a huge aid packet that has bailed Pakistan out of near bankruptcy and put its economy onto a favorable growth path. But for India, nothing really. Not even a nod to India8217;s quest for a seat on the UN8217;s high table, even though Washington is willing to support Germany and Japan8217;s claim; while Russia, France and even Britain formally announced their support for India8217;s claim to a place on the UN8217;s Security Council. The reason for Washington8217;s hesitance is not hard to gauge. It8217;s at Pakistan8217;s request.
While Washington8217;s interest in Pakistan, in the long run, is to prevent it from becoming a failed state, in the short-term it wants Pakistan to cough up Osama bin Laden and some of his mischievous mullahs. But the most serious embarrassment for both countries is the exposure about nuclear peddling and the myopic view of the black market run by the now infamous Pakistani merchant of menace, Dr A Q Khan. I would therefore argue that India can gain little from the US, and must rethink its foreign policy calculations and go back to the issues that have been ignored by South Block since the end of the Cold War.
There is an old ally up north in Moscow that could help India counter the games Washington plays. The advantages of going back to the Russians 8212; although India has a far greater global standing now 8212; are many. Russia still produces state-of-the-art military equipment 8212; such as the Sukhoi fighters 8212; and at much cheaper costs. Besides, Indian troops are familiar with Russian equipment, that is tough and comes with technology transfers. Secondly, economic cooperation and assured guarantees of oil supply from Siberia and Sakhalin islands would boost our energy supplies. Thirdly, there would be greater sympathy and understanding for India8217;s fight against cross-border terrorism since Moscow is also battling a similar menace that come from the Chechens. America has, on the other hand, even failed to condemn Pakistan8217;s terrorist links. Fourthly, Russian technology could further enhance our space programme, nuclear reactors we already have some of both of these and missile systems. And finally, in the event of a future Indo-Pak stand-off, Moscow could counter any Chinese threat, not that Beijing would resort to making threats in all certainty.
And while we are on the subject, let us not forget the support and understanding that India has received from the French 8212; especially after the Pokharan nuclear tests 8212; and Germany. The French had in fact defied the Anglo-American lobby and supported India when New Delhi was briefly in the diplomatic doghouse. And Germans had the wisdom to declare India a strategic partner as early as the mid-1990s. The point, in short, is that there is light at the end of the tunnel for New Delhi if it has the wisdom to abandon its American obsession. Relations with the US would only be worth boasting about in case Rice was to have made a stopover only in Delhi and then perhaps gone back to the US or to America8217;s closest Asian ally, Japan. And when was the last time a US President visited India?
The writer is Visiting Professor of International Relations, Middlesex University, London
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