Psychological boost

Coming on the heels of US economic sanctions, the Indo-Russian deal for a 2,000 MW nuclear power plant is a big psychological boost for India. The deal has been presented as a supplement to the Rajiv Gandhi-Mikhail Gorbachev agreement of 1988. As such it cannot be said to go against Russian undertakings in 1992 not to export nuclear technology to countries with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in which category India falls. Although this may still amount only to a one-time break in the two-decade old weapons power embargo on the transfer of critical technology to this country, it is nevertheless a major and significant one. On the Indian side, despite domestic criticism on technical, environmental and safety grounds, the Department of Atomic Energy has been consistently in favour of acquiring two 1,000 MW, VVER-type Russian reactors for the Koodankulam power plant. The long delay in processing the agreement occurred on the Russian side.

For Moscow to go ahead with the deal after Pokhran-II, when even morepressure can be expected from the other weapons powers, proves several things. On the foreign policy front, it confirms the importance of the relationship with India. Russia has been in accord with some but not all of Washington8217;s non-proliferation objectives, seeing the virtue of the denuclearisation of Khazakhstan and Ukraine but opposing US sanctions aimed at curtailing India8217;s weapons programme. Without pressing the point too far, Moscow8217;s independent approach towards India can be seen as a corrective to President Clinton8217;s professed desire to involve China closely in the management of South Asian affairs. All these are encouraging signs for India. At the same time, it is as well to recognise that reviving the Koodankulam project would have involved some hard bargaining on the Indian and Russian sides. India8217;s definite interest in concluding large defence deals, including S-300 anti-missile systems, during the defence secretary, Ajit Kumar8217;s recent trip to Russia, was probably what it took to wear downthe last of Moscow8217;s resistance to the nuclear power plant deal.

All this said, some major long-standing questions remain about the Koodankulam project. The DAE confirms that VVER reactors being offered to India are the most advanced version, comply with Indian and international safety standards and are essential for the nuclear power programme. What has not been established are the technical-cost advantages of large 1,000 MW reactors over smaller versions in the Russian stable. Secondly, at today8217;s prices the deal is worth between 3 and 3.5 billion or Rs 6-7 crore per MW when gas-based new projects work out at Rs 4 crore per MW. Thirdly, where does it leave the indigenous nuclear power programme with its unsatisfactory operational performance and plant availability, and retarded growth?

Finally, and most importantly from the public8217;s point of view, it is all very well to explain that VVERs are not Chernobyl-type RBMK reactors. But even with the best technology in the world, the nuclear power programmeneeds a genuinely independent regulatory watchdog acting in the public interest and technically equipped to do so. The AERB is not such a body.