
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif are not amused. President General Pervez Musharraf has usurped a key element of their political agenda 8212; peace with India 8212; without as much as nodding 8216;8216;thank you8217;8217;. Worse, the world is lauding General Musharraf8217;s 8216;8216;courage and statesmanship8217;8217; while the two 8216;8216;popular8217;8217; leaders who paid the price of dismissal by the military for advocating it in the first place continue to languish in the wilderness.
Sharif8217;s peculiar circumstances forbid him to voice his protest freely. So he has merely chafed at the Indians for befriending the 8216;8216;architect of Kargil8217;8217; and warned that General Musharraf8217;s agreements would not outlast him. Meanwhile, loyal lieutenants like Zulfikar Khosa and Saad Rafiq have slammed General Musharraf for 8216;8216;admitting that the freedom fighters and jihadis of Kashmir are terrorists8217;8217;. In short, the PMLN has not welcomed the peace dialogue initiated by President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee.
Bhutto8217;s position is more 8216;8216;flexible8217;8217; here8217;s that wonderful, born-again word again!. She welcomes the peace dialogue because she considers herself its original architect. But she warns India and the world that General Musharraf is a great tactician and is merely 8216;8216;using the peace moves to appease international pressure8217;8217;. She reminds us that 8216;8216;the Indo-Pak peace talks are taking place when the Taliban are regrouping and Pakistan is investigating allegations of sale of nuclear technology by its scientists8217;8217;.
Meanwhile, Aitzaz Ahsan of the PPP wonders why Parliament was not consulted by General Musharraf. Indeed, in an attempt to sow discord among Musharraf8217;s partners in government, Ahsan expresses regret ! that the Prime Minister, Zafarullah Jamali, was 8216;8216;humiliated8217;8217; because he was not taken into confidence by General Musharraf in the final stages of the agreement.
The position of the two mainstream parties and their leaders is perfectly understandable if not always justifiable. For well-known reasons, Sharif hates Musharraf. He knows that as long as the military man is around, his own fate is bleak. Therefore he will do anything to undermine his nemesis. That is why every Musharraf success, even when it is in the national interest, is tarred with the brush of failure by the PMLN lest it strengthen him.
Bhutto8217;s case is slightly different. She doesn8217;t hate Musharraf. In fact, she would very much like to work with him. She had fervently hoped that he would make a political alliance with her to strengthen himself against Sharif, just as General Zia ul Haq had done with Sharif against her two decades ago. But that has not happened.
Musharraf8217;s terms were unacceptable to Bhutto. He wanted to do a 8216;8216;soft deal8217;8217; with Amin Fahim and the PPP to the exclusion of Bhutto and Zardari which would have effectively banished them from the reckoning for at least five years. She refused, suspecting an attempt not just to remove her from the political scene but also to usurp her party. In the event, Musharraf has used the same stick of corruption to flog both Bhutto and Sharif, making a deal with the mullahs in the bargain. Bhutto is therefore warning the world that he is grooming the MMA to take over the government in a 8216;8216;soft revolution8217;8217;.
8216;8216;The mainstream parties are being kept out and the marginal parties are being brought into the power equation,8217;8217; argues Bhutto. 8216;8216;Musharraf8217;s covert agenda coincides with the mullahs8217; overt agenda. Musharraf has a double agenda: his tactical agenda is to adopt the policies of the PPP to throw dust in the eyes of the democratic forces. His strategic agenda is to further the aims of the MMA and the MQM that pit him against the PPP because he wants to tell the world that the choice in Pakistan is between military dictatorship and dictatorship of the religious forces.8217;8217;
Bhutto8217;s analysis is obviously self-serving. It suits her to warn the world not to trust the 8216;8216;two-faced General Musharraf8217;8217; by putting all its eggs in his basket. But a critical element of what she says is true enough. Musharraf8217;s insistence on keeping the PPP out of the loop has led him to bring the MMA into the equation. However, the MMA is not Musharraf8217;s poodle. Far from it. It has an agenda all of its own in which Musharraf is to be excluded from the equation.
Thus we have a situation in which both Musharraf and the MMA are engaged in extracting mileage from their alliance with each other without giving up their independence or initiative. In other words, and contrary to Bhutto8217;s analysis, it is a tactical rather than a strategic alliance between Musharraf and the MMA.
In 2004, this Military Mullah Alliance is bound to unravel in view of its inherent contradictions. That is when Musharraf8217;s domestic and international space to manoeuvre will be threatened. That is also when he will need to reconsider the utility of having the PPP as a partner rather than as a protagonist against him. Bhutto would therefore be advised to bide her time and play her cards with greater tactical dexterity than before.
The Friday Times