
Some days ago, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf announced a new package for the Northern Areas, focusing on political and administrative aspects. After converting the Northern Areas, as Baroness Emma Nicholson, the author of EU report on J038;K defined it, into a 8216;black-hole8217; over the last 60 years, a reforms package for the region today causes surprise.
But before critiquing the package, understanding it is important. First, it aims to convert the existing administrative body 8212; the Northern Areas Legislative Council NALC into a Northern Areas Legislative Assembly NALA. The NALC at present has 36 seats, 24 of them elected and 12 reserved six for women and six for technocrats.
Second, the proposed package aims to convert the deputy chief executive of the NALC into the chief executive with full administrative and financial powers. As of today, the chief executive of the NALC is appointed by Islamabad, who is the federal minister for Kashmir Affairs and Northern
Areas Affairs KANA. Besides, the package announcement also included the creation of a new
district covering Hunza and Nagar the seventh in the Northern Area mainly from Gilgit, the appointment of an accountant general and the formation of a commission to resolve the dispute between the Northern Areas and the NWFP.
How serious is this package? Does this address the basic demands of the people of the Northern Areas? The local population has, for a long while, been arguing for an effective administrative body, which has substantial, if not full, local representation. Even today, the Northern Areas are governed by the Legal Framework
Order since the 1970s; before that, the region from 1947 was governed by the archaic and outdated Frontier Crime Regulations, promulgated by the British, actually to deal with the tribal population here.
Although the package aims at creating a chief executive who would be elected by the new legislative assembly, there are several imponderables. One, what administrative and financial powers are likely to be transferred from the KANA to NALA and how is the chief executive likely to wield them? Two, since the present chief executive, an appointee of Islamabad, is expected to become the chairman of the NALA, what is likely to be the relationship between these two pillars 8212; one indirectly elected by the people of the Northern Areas and the other directly appointed by Islamabad. If substantial powers are not delegated to the NALA or if the chairman wields more power than the chief executive in exercising the authority, it would negate the very purpose of the reforms package. If one has to go through the POK experience, although the prime minister of 8216;Azad Jammu and Kashmir8217; enjoys considerable powers in theory, Islamabad controls him through the president, who is always imposed by Pakistan. Three, since the NALA is also likely to have powers to pass no-confidence motions against the chief executive and the speaker of the house, what political manipulations is likely to be played, if the chief executive fails to toe Islamabad8217;s line. Since NALA is likely to be a small body of 36 members with 12 reserved seats, it will be relatively easy to manipulate it.
How effective and strong the NALA will be in its discussions vis-agrave;-vis Peshawar over the border dispute between the Northern Areas and the NWFP, is the fourth aspect. Currently, the major dispute here is the Bhasha-Diamer, a mega-dam project on the Indus. There have been numerous protests in the region over the last two years on the dam, as it is going to displace nearly 30,000 people, inundate almost 30,000 acres of barren land and 1,600 acres of arable land in Diamer district. Whereas the benefits and royalties is likely to be shared, the locals believe that they alone will have to bear the human and environmental costs of the project.
Then there are questions about the structure and functions of the new body. People in the Northern Areas, who are more than two millions, are extremely upset with the package. For one, they have been demanding universal adult franchise, fundamental rights and access to an independent judiciary, if not Pakistan8217;s supreme court directly. Political groups and organisations here, including the Gilgit Baltistan National Alliance, have been demanding self- rule for the Northern Areas and not just administrative and political reforms.
Given this, the new package appears to be a case of too little, too late. As to why Musharraf has attempted such a package at this juncture, and what it means for India-Pakistan relations is, of course, other aspects that demand the attention of policymakers in this country.
The writer is visiting fellow, Centre for Strategic and Regional Studies, Jammu University and assistant director, IPCS, New Delhi