Nuclear arm-twisting

The adjournment of the NSG special meeting, which had been called to consider a waiver for India from its stringent export control rules...

The adjournment of the NSG special meeting, which had been called to consider a waiver for India from its stringent export control rules governing international nuclear trade, has caused some gloating among opponents of the Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement, both among the non-proliferation ayatollahs in the US and opposition parties at home. Such rejoicing may, however, be somewhat premature. Change faces resistance, and the greater the magnitude of the change, the greater the opposition. That the agreement constitutes a major shift is proved by the degree of resistance to it, if nothing else.

The agreement presages major movement not only in Indo-US relations. The global regime of non-proliferation mechanisms is also being asked to adapt itself to new realities and a changing distribution of power. It has over the years faced internal challenges; states-parties to the NPT have not only accepted and condoned some proliferators within their ranks, but have been questioning the very validity of the structure8217;s basis. Part of the problem has arisen because of the regime8217;s inflexibility. The Indo-US agreement introduces, into this rigid framework of sterile debate and unchanging positions, the need for an updating of the approach to the real dangers of proliferation, an opportunity for the NPT to strengthen itself. The opposition to the draft waiver presented to the NSG was bound to create a storm, especially among countries which, while they have no nuclear industry of their own 8212; or at any rate none of any significance 8212; are yet members of the group and hold feverishly to the letter of a treaty negotiated 40 years ago.

To get an idea of the changes envisaged, one has only to revisit the original negotiation of the NPT. To quote George Perkovich 8220;of the four major issues of concern to India 8211; ending further production of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems; securing commitments to pursue nuclear disarmament; obtaining security guarantees; and retaining the right to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions 8211; the nuclear weapon states offered little give. They concentrated their exertions on three narrower objectives which included precluding the transfer of nuclear weapons and sensitive materials and know-how to other states8221;. India of course lost that battle and opted out of the treaty. Perkovich adds: 8220;India may have had logic, principle and the 1965 negotiating mandate on its side, but the United States and other nuclear weapon states had power on their side.8221; Presumably, this latter group included those protected by the nuclear umbrella of the nuclear weapon powers. The positions of Austria, the Netherlands, Ireland, Switzerland and New Zealand at that time are not known.

The issue today, of course, is not what countries did or did not do 40 years ago, but whether those countries which today feel that, in spite of the changed global scenario, India will accept conditions on international cooperation that are 8220;prescriptive8221; are willing or able to stem the tide of change. Now, as then, the US has the 8216;power8217;; it also has the obligation under the Indo-US Joint Statement of July 18 2005, to persuade its friends and allies 8220;8230;to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India8221;. India8217;s role would seem to be more or less over.

If the US administration, exhausted by the drawn-out negotiations, perhaps not itself convinced of their own case for exceptionalising India and suffering from end-of-term syndrome, is unable or unwilling to exercise that power, India will have no option but to 8220;walk away8221; once again.

The decision is, no doubt, a political one; it is also a substantive one, one which could either strengthen the positions of the genuine non-proliferationists at the forthcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference, or could condemn it to a replay of the previous conferences, with stale debates and repetitive speeches, not to mention disagreements even on agendas. For India, there would be no separation plan, no additional safeguards; India would be free to cut her ambitions to source her energy requirements from nuclear sources, her strategic programme would remain on course though her international relations will, necessarily, be impacted. Clearly, the government has not shut the door, recognising that being part of and in a sense a part-initiator of such major changes, patience and perseverance are more likely to succeed than an abrupt termination of negotiations, the latter being more characteristic of a weaker state than India is today.

The fact that the NSG has decided on dates for the next meeting would seem to indicate a willingness to bring the issue to a successful conclusion 8212; the postponement not being open-ended. There appears to be a feeling that such disagreements that do exist can be met by a drafting exercise. The intervening two weeks should, however, see more political than clerical activity, more pressure on arms than on elbows.

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The writer is former ambassador of India to the United Nations in Geneva

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