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It has been one year since the Sri Lankan security forces 8216;liberated8217; the whole of the east from the LTTE...

It has been one year since the Sri Lankan security forces 8216;liberated8217; the whole of the east from the LTTE and shifted their operations to Mannar in the west with an objective to capture the remaining areas in one year. How successful has the government been in achieving its objective? The LTTE spoke of 8216;strategic retreat8217; from the east and vowed to 8216;give a fitting reply to the government8217;. Were the Tigers able to achieve their goal? Where is the conflict heading? Is there any scope for peace in the near future?

Since the 8216;one year8217; deadline has gone, the Army commander, Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, has revised the target to one more year to 8216;finish the LTTE8217;. In the past year, however, according to the Army chief, the LTTE has 8216;lost the capability to fight as a conventional force8217; due to the relentless 8216;overall military strategy8217;. The present strategy of the military is 8216;not just go for terrains, but to go for the kill8217;. The Army claims to have killed 9000 Tigers by losing 1700 of its personnel since August 2006. If this strategy is sustained, the Army feels that in a year8217;s time the Tigers would be reduced to nothing more than a 8216;rag-tag terrorist outfit8217;. The LTTE already has lost key leaders like Tamilselvan to such strategy carried out by 8216;deep penetration units8217; with incessant air strikes. It is true that the government forces could make advances in the southwest breaching the forward defence lines of the LTTE in the district of Mannar. There are some successes along Vavuniya and Welioya in the south. Overall, about 150 square kms were captured from the LTTE. The plan now is to gradually encircle Kilinochchi, the LTTE8217;s administrative capital, from all sides.

However, the fact that not much progress is seen at the northern front clearly demonstrates that the LTTE8217;s conventional capability has not been compromised. The Tigers are perhaps making 8216;strategic withdrawal8217; in the south, but stiffly guarding the Elephant Pass in the north. As envisaged by the Army chief, even if the LTTE8217;s conventional capability is reduced, the group would be fighting a 8216;different war8217;. Tigers are already using hit and run tactics in the east and suicide attacks in the south. At the minimum, therefore, a low intensity conflict would continue for some years. Even the LTTE chief, Prabhakaran, by luck, falls, the dynamics of the conflict are not expected to change dramatically. The main challenge for the government, at this juncture, is to sustain the present military push during an economic downslide and amidst international criticism of human rights violations.

Militarily confident, the government is unwilling to resume talks unless the LTTE lays down arms unconditionally. On the other hand, the LTTE will never come to the negotiating table, except when it can dictate terms from an advantageous position. Given these entrenched positions, peace is only a distant dream. Even a 8216;hurting stalemate8217; would result only in a ceasefire, but not to talks leading to a final settlement. The onus is on the government to sincerely present an acceptable devolution package to the Tamils. The All Party Representative Committee APRC, formed to 8216;fashion creative options that satisfy minimum expectations as well as provide a comprehensive approach to the resolution of the national question8217;, has not come good. Instead of exploring creative options, the APRC, in its interim report, advised the President to implement the 13th amendment to the Constitution, which outlined devolution to provinces after Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 1987. Even after 20 years, ideas are back to square one.

However, the government is unwilling to implement even these old ideas. It is appreciable that President Rajapakse conducted elections firstly to local councils in Batticaloa district in March and then to now de-merged Eastern province in May this year. The post-election governance in the east, however, is not promising. This is an opportunity for the government to demonstrate its earnestness over power-sharing with minorities. The opportunity, however, seems to be misused to show to the international community that 8216;democracy has been restored in the former fascist areas8217;. Instead of being a mute spectator, the international community, including India, should involve proactively to seek a political solution to the ethnic question. Why not form a consortium to exert leverage on both antagonists?

The author is Senior Fellow, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.