
It is a dangerous moment for the Sri Lankan nation-state. Its hapless citizens 8212; the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil and Muslim minorities 8212; are caught between the frequent onslaught of rebel-initiated suicide attacks, and rebel- and government-induced 8216;disappearances8217;. Aid workers say that over 200,000 persons mainly Tamils are trapped in the line of fire because the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam LTTE will not let them leave. This will make it hard for the government to adhere to its policy of 8220;zero civilian casualties.8221; The abrogation of the 2002 ceasefire agreement in January means neither side is constrained by internationally monitored agreements.
Over 70,000 deaths and a quarter-century of sustained fighting later, there is little change in attitudes; the actions of both the government and the Tigers privilege a military solution even as they claim to be committed to a political solution. Sri Lankans are trapped between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, a resurgent Sri Lankan military is poised to try to deal a death-blow to the rebels: they are now at the doorstep of the Tigers8217; administrative and military center at Kilinochchi, barely two kilometers away from the rebels8217; city office. On the other, the rebels have resorted to a blitz of suicide attacks 8212; six last month 8212; in Sinhalese-majority areas of the Western and Southern provinces.
In the past, LTTE supremo Prabhakaran used suicide terrorism both from a position of weakness 8212; when he was on the point of losing a key battle, and from a position of strength 8212; like in 2005 when they had rearmed and no longer needed to continue peace talks. This time, Prabhakaran has launched suicide strikes because the LTTE is fighting with its back to the wall. The defection of a key aide, Karuna, who transformed his breakaway Eastern faction into a recognised political party and himself into an MP has further eroded LTTE8217;s monopoly. Military analysts rightly speculate that the LTTE is causing civilian casualties in Sinhalese areas to coerce the government into a ceasefire.
The military has gained the upper hand due to several factors. First, several decades of fighting honed it into a battle-hardened corps. After a year-long military stalemate, its morale was boosted by recent successes in capturing key LTTE positions including a key coastal port of Vidattaltivu, across the narrow Palk Strait. This has weakened the LTTE8217;s ability to maintain a reliable supply of arms, among other things. Second, the military budget got large infusions of additional funds under President Rajapakse who publicly proclaimed his intention to defeat the LTTE. Third, the global war against terrorism has provided more armaments and surveillance technology to the Sri Lankan military, while reducing the flow of arms and funds to the LTTE. The Indian government signed agreements to train the Sri Lankan military and supply 8216;non-lethal8217; military hardware, while its security forces have cracked down on LTTE operatives in Tamil Nadu and provided crucial information that enabled the Sri Lankan navy to sink the Tigers8217; supply vessels. Stringent bans on the LTTE hit its funding pipeline from among the Tamil diaspora in the West
It is difficult to achieve decisive victory over the LTTE: in the past, the Tigers just retreated to the jungles. Some argue, though, that the military is thrice the size today and has adopted small-unit commando tactics with improved weaponry.
But even if the military beats the Tigers, thegovernment8217;s heavy-handedness towards its Tamil minorities does not bode well for a reduction in anti-Tamil chauvinism, the original trigger for the rise of the LTTE. The government has already tightened surveillance in Colombo including conducting a census to identify Tamils from the North and the East. This has triggered concerns about racial profiling and harassment of minorities. Worryingly, concern about terrorism muted international criticism.
So what is to be done? First, it is imperative that the lives of the citizens caught in the war-zones are not treated as collateral damage. India, the USA, the EU, Japan and others need to ensure that trapped citizens get safe passage and humanitarian aid until they can return to their homes. Second, they should condemn the human rights violations by the LTTE and the government, and use economic measures to prevent further occurrences. Third, these countries should seize the moment when both combatants become battle-weary and negotiate a cease-fire, while ensuring that subsequent peace-talks are not used as holding patterns to build arsenals.
Only when the government and the rebels realize that a war is unwinnable, can peace limp into the embattled island. Until then, we will see the erosion of the multi-ethnic nature of Sri Lanka.
The writer is at the Centre for Policy Research, Delhi
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