Mission possible

Islamabad8217;s promise to create a violence free environment and not to let terrorists use its soil against India was critical to New Delhi8217;s offer to negotiate purposefully on Kashmir.

Even as Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was preparing the ground for a major initiative on Kashmir8212;on both its internal and external dimensions8212; a new pattern of violence began to emerge that could no longer be ignored by New Delhi.

The Prime Minister8217;s approach involved creating a new framework to address the long-standing grievances of the Kashmiri people and putting across a specific set of new proposals on resolving the dispute with Pakistan.

The former involved the creation of the Round Table process in Kashmir and the latter some new ideas on formalising institutional mechanisms for cooperation between the divided parts of J038;K.

But Manmohan Singh8217;s ability to move forward boldly on this front has been severely complicated by the Mumbai blasts which came close to breaching India8217;s threshold of tolerance to cross-border terrorism.

The big political question after the Mumbai attacks was whether India must continue with the peace process amid evidence of growing violence organised and fomented from across the border.

India did not need new evidence to suggest that Lashkar-e-Toiba8212;responsible for nearly 80 per cent of the terrorist violence in India8212;was alive and kicking with strong support from the Pakistan Army.

While the US and UK might be surprised by new trend lines on the involvement of Kashmir related militant groups in terrorism against the West, India was fully aware that the Pakistan Army was never going to give up on Lashkar8212;the favourite child it has nurtured for so many years.

For this reason, New Delhi was neither impressed with Pakistan8217;s denial of its involvement in the growing violence in India nor was it enthused by Islamabad8217;s offer to cooperate in the investigations of the Mumbai massacre.

India was aware that Lashkar has begun to function brazenly in Pakistan under the new name of Jamat-ud-Dawa and that Pakistan has no intention of closing down the terror camps on its soil.

As it debated the nature of the relationship between the peace process and renewed cross-border terrorism, India was torn between the imperatives of a tough response to Pakistan and the dangers that could arise from the collapse of the peace process.

New Delhi chose to adopt what can be termed a middle path.

It pointed a finger at 8220;elements across the border8221; for the violence without directly blaming the Pakistani government for the Mumbai massacre. While insisting that the peace process has not been called off, India also decided to postpone the foreign secretary talks that were scheduled to be held in New Delhi in the second half of July.

When the two foreign secretaries met on the sidelines of a South Asian meeting at Dhaka in early August, the Indian side pitched its demands for some specific actions by Pakistan to restore mutual faith.

The demand was also reiterated by the Prime Minister in his Independence Day speech from the Red Fort. As he awaits Pakistani response, Manmohan Singh has signaled that he remains committed to the peace process. His conviction that the destinies of India and Pakistan are interlinked appears intact.

While the peace process might once again pick up momentum in the coming months, it is unlikely to remain the same in the future.

As Pakistan enters a complex phase of domestic squabbling over General Pervez Musharraf8217;s constitutional status, India is likely to underline the limitation of the peace process if it remains restricted to a series of official talks with the Pakistani government. There is a growing recognition in New Delhi that India needs to develop a long-term strategy towards Pakistan that would involve wider engagement with all the political forces across the border.

As it breaks the presumed political linkage between the peace process and violence, India is inevitably focused on a more ambitious political objective8212;of finding ways to influence the internal evolution of the Pakistani state and society.