Menon and Burns

A nuclear job well begun is only half done. But diplomats are paid to bridge unbridgeables

After two days of intensive talks in Washington, Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon and US Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns have dispelled the widespread pessimism that had enveloped the prospects for ending India8217;s long nuclear isolation. However, the distance between the promise offered in Washington this week and the completion of the negotiations remains a long one. Failure to move forward this week, Menon and Burns knew, would have doomed the nuclear project that was initiated and nurtured by two very different Indian prime ministers, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh, in their engagement with US President George W. Bush.

It is no secret that there are many in the US, India and the rest of the world, who would love to see the bold nuclear manoeuvre collapse. The very historic nature of the deal, which involves rewriting the global nuclear rules in favour of India, is the source of continuing political resistance to it. What drove Washington and New Delhi into breaking the non-proliferation paradigm was the recognition of the urgency to transform the Indo-US political relationship by removing what once seemed an impossible nuclear barrier.

This broader vision was lost amid differences over drafting the so-called 123 agreement, which sets the legal terms for bilateral nuclear cooperation. To be sure, the issues at hand were complex and demanded imaginative compromises. Among the difficulties to be addressed were the consequences of a potential Indian nuclear test and New Delhi8217;s freedom to reprocess the spent fuel. Bush needs a 123 agreement that is consistent with the Hyde Act, which defines the law on nuclear cooperation with India. Singh needs to be sure that the terms of such cooperation do not constrain India8217;s long-term options on energy and national security. Smart diplomats know they are paid to bridge seemingly irreconcilable differences. Menon and Burns have done well to kick-start a faltering nuclear negotiation. To finish the job, they will need the unstinting support of their political masters. Without an early and decisive political intervention, there is a real danger that the end game will be hijacked by nit-pickers in India and those in Washington seeking to use the Iran card against New Delhi. While the UPA is aware of the bureaucratic opposition within, it would be unwise to underestimate the gathering storm in Washington on India8217;s ties with Iran.