Leave it to diplomacy

Pyongyang8217;s nuclear testing on October 9 need not surprise those who have been watching developments in the Korean peninsula for the past several years, beginning with the Bush administration8217;s naming of North Korea as a charter member of the 8220;axis of evil8221; league, the US attack on Iraq and the steady deterioration of the six-party talks. Nor do they make a huge difference technically, because Pyongyang was widely believed to have already stockpiled a handful of nuclear weapons, without having conducted tests.

Cynics might argue, with some justification, that having nuclear weapons for North Korea makes good strategic sense; the main difference between Kim Jong Il and Saddam Hussein being that the latter did not have a nuclear deterrent to US attack.

International condemnation of the North Korean test has been swift and strong. Many in the international community have expressed apprehension that the tests represent a major worsening of the security situation in the Korean peninsula, and could spark a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia.

But whether the tests will spark a chain reaction towards instability and arms race depends on several factors. First, the attitude of China matters. Although Beijing8217; 8220;failure8221; to prevent the North Korean test has been widely noted, this does not mean Beijing has no cards left to play in containing Pyongyang8217;s nuclear ambitions. Beijing is still the major source of sustenance to the Kim Jong Il regime. And Beijing8217;s swift and unequivocal condemnation of the test shows that it is serious, for reasons of self-interest, about not allowing a nuclear arms race in the Korean Peninsula which would tilt the military balance against it.

What is more important, the apparently successful visit by the new Japanese Prime Minister to both Beijing and Seoul has not only brought about a thaw in the climate of mistrust that had marked their recent relationship. It also underscored a rare measure of common interest between the two Asian powers which are seen as natural and historic rivals for influence in Asia. China has no interest in Japan using the North Korean test as an excuse to go nuclear, which it has the technological wherewithal for. But Abe8217;s disavowal of any such ambition is also reassuring and would dampen whatever temptation Seoul might have for acquiring nuclear weapons itself.

This leads then to the biggest uncertain factor on how the geopolitical repercussions of the North Korean nuclear test will play out: the attitude of the US. The Bush administration8217;s response has been predictably harsh. North Korea 8220;can have a future or it can have these weapons,8221; said Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Christopher Hill, adding. 8220;It cannot have both.8221; This sort of language will be seen in Pyongyang as a renewed call for 8220;regime change8221;, and stoke insecurities which, in the face of the refusal of the US to hold direct talks with Pyongyang, had contributed to the latter8217;s decision to embark on this dangerous course of action. While the US is unlikely to reverse the policy of not talking to Pyongyang directly, it will be important whether Washington will allow newly-anointed South Korean Secretary-General, who assumes office in the new year, to give diplomacy a chance to diffuse the crisis.

In short, the nuclear crisis in the Korean peninsula is not irreversible. Nor does it mean an inevitable nuclear arms race in the region. But much depends on Abe8217;s handling of ties with China, and the US response to the crisis. A visit to the Yasukuni shrine by Abe would undo the good his trip to Beijing has generated. The reaffirmation of Japan8217;s continued non-nuclear posture is helpful. The easing of Sino-Japanese mistrust under the new Japanese leader will facilitate a common understanding over the need to prevent a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia. If Washington obliges by leaving room for diplomacy, then the crisis created by north Korea8217;s nuclear tests may be contained.

The writer is deputy director, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and a senior fellow, Asia-Pacific Foundation, Canada