Learning from terror

The terrorist strikes at Tanda and a few more army facilities in the recent past in JK, have raised pertinent questions concerning the secu...

The terrorist strikes at Tanda and a few more army facilities in the recent past in J038;K, have raised pertinent questions concerning the security policy and the drills followed by security personnel in countering threats to their own establishments. Such incidents, besides being costly in terms of casualties, are damaging in terms of morale and the message they send out.

I recollect that in the early 1960s when a former colonel commandant of my regiment and then a corps commander in Kashmir, Lt Gen Daulet Singh, went down in an air crash while on an operational sortie alongwith many high-ranking army and air force officers, a strict rule was passed that senior officers should avoid travelling together by air.

Again, travel by any other mode by senior commanders is often staggered, and knowledge of this movement is kept a top secret. Were these precautions taken at Tanda? It must also be asked whether such a high powered visit was called for to a small EME subunit, where possibly the hunt for the fugitives was still on, and where the corps commander would have already briefed the army commander about the incident earlier that morning. The most dangerous time for another terrorist strike is often the post-first strike period when confusion is still prevailing in the 8216;hit8217; vicinity. The tendency for senior officers to rush in, and the incomplete sanitising and clearing of hostile elements from an affected area, are matters that need attention.

Another aspect that needs looking into is the spate of visits from the headquarters and ministers to the site of the incident. Is there a need for these flying visits by the top brass? The need of the hour is for the local army commanders to identify and eradicate the grey areas that have resulted in this unfortunate incident. There is another weakness in our command structure. Our serving generals and their counterparts are going too frequently to the media even while an incident is unfolding. That8217;s the time for them to get hold of their commands and not as in Kargil, to give interviews. That sort of thing is best left to journalists 8216;8216;I am speaking from a bunker8217;8217;, not commanders whose point of view is always best enunciated by the official spokesperson of the ministry of defence.

Security counter-measures for the cantonments, family lines and large depots and installations where civilians work are the areas of concern. Meanwhile, the media must understand that in moments like this, the soldier needs to be left alone to get on with the prime task of getting at the terrorist.

The writer is a retired major-general