Just DRDO won146;t do

While we are debating DRDO8217;s track record, we must keep in mind that some high-end technologies continue to be denied to India, and here DRDO plays a vital role. Furthermore, sometimes it was re-inventing the wheel. However, we still have tremendous room for systemic and regulatory improvements.

A special CAG review in 2000 of DRDO8217;s Vehicles Research and Development Establishment, Ahmedabad, found that almost 50 per cent of the lab8217;s budget was spent on salaries, with a ratio of 11 non-scientists for every scientist. At present the ratio of scientists in DRDO to other supporting personnel is 1:5. In DARPA, this is 1.4:1, meaning that out of the 240 people working at DARPA, only 100 are non-technical! The human resources programmes at DARPA are extremely flexible. World-class scientists are acquired from the private sector and universities. Several supporting personnel are temporarily hired from other agencies so that DARPA doesn8217;t have to support them on a permanent basis. Yet it is as sought-after as an employer as any leading defence private company.

Although the US defence budget is almost 25 times larger than that of India, DARPA8217;s annual budget is only twice the size of DRDO8217;s. DARPA8217;s comparatively low budget in relation to US defence spending is due to the fact that the agency is focused on high-end technologies, leaving other systems to industry. This has enabled it to stay lean. In the case of the Arjun MBT and Akash missile, DRDO needs to follow better management practices to deliver indigenous technologies to the military. The production of juices and insect repellants are other instances where the DRDO urgently needs to rethink its focus.

The various DRDO labs should avoid any kind of overlap and duplication. The organisation must draw up a list of future technologies based on certain criteria and go after them aggressively. First, strategic technology that no country may sell to India 8212; for example, nuclear weapons, surveillance and communication satellites and long range cruise missiles. Second, technologies which are heading towards a global monopoly like conventional submarines presently being sold at a very high price. Third, future technologies on drawing boards all over the world 8212; like unmanned combat aerial vehicles UCAVs, unmanned underwater vehicles UUVs and robot soldiers. If our government8217;s scientific and research organisations can make the world8217;s most competitive satellite launch vehicles, we can surely do the same with other high-end defence technologies.

India can build strong indigenous capabilities while creating competitive benchmarks for DRDO through the active participation of the private sector. The Kelkar Committee has suggested important measures, and the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence has taken up this issue several times, inviting suggestions from trade associations. Earlier, India Inc wasn8217;t capable of building tanks or undertaking high-end R038;D. Today, the industry is geared up to meet the challenge and the government only needs to establish a leak-proof regulatory framework that hand-holds the industry initially. The government could also provide tax incentives on the lines of those provided to the pharmaceutical industry.

And the DRDO must engage industry in a transparent manner. DARPA sends its programme managers to the private sector to jointly work on a technology. Once it is ready, it doesn8217;t matter who produces it, as long as it is done in a manner that is both cost and time effective, even while delivering on quality.

Defence public sector undertakings DPSUs and government-owned ordnance factories must be subjected to competition. India8217;s telecommunications, aviation and oil 038; gas sectors have generated incredible domestic as well as foreign investments due to deregulation. In defence, we continue to subsidise the economies of Russia and Israel by importing goods from them.

If India has built world-class multinationals in sectors such as information technology and pharmaceuticals, both of which are knowledge-driven industries, we could easily create a handful of defence multinationals in less than a decade that are more cost and quality competitive than their counterparts elsewhere. Besides reducing our reliance on imports, we would also generate massive investment in India, thereby creating employment opportunities.

The development and control of key defence technologies would be in Indian hands. Moreover, India would become a net exporter of defence goods and services rather than an importer. A small nation like Israel accounts for a tenth of world defence sales and approximately a fifth of its exports are defence-related. While India had an annual import bill of around 5 billion last year, we exported a paltry 47 million worth of arms. Pakistan, which lacks our industrial base, exported nearly twice as much.

In 2001 the government permitted 26 per cent FDI in defence production and full private participation in certain areas of the sector. But since 2002 the government received less than a dozen applications for private sector participation in defence. In addition to reforming the DRDO, therefore, the viability of select DPSUs, especially those not dealing with core areas like the production of missiles and warheads, should also be re-examined and certain products like food products should either be scrapped or outsourced to lower-cost vendors.

The writer is an MP and member of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence