Jaw-jaw, not war-war

Again, when the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir was converted into the Line of Control LoC in 1972 after the Bangladesh war, the agreement signed at Shimla said that 8220;neither side shall seek to alterit LoC unilaterally irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations.8221; The agreement also emphasised that 8220;the LoC should be respected by both sides, without prejudice to the recognised position of either side.8221;

The Lahore Declaration recalled Simla agreement and reiterated that the two countries would find a solution to the Kashmir problem through bilateral talks. Some beginning was also made. BJP leaders even changed their lingo on Kashmir. They used to refer to it as an integral part of India.

But they did not repeat those words after the Declaration. Vajpayee even admitted Kashmir was a disputed territory without actually saying so when he announced at the Lahore civic reception his determination8217; to seek a solution to the problem with all the resources at his command. He raised the level of talks by agreeing to the supervision by foreign ministers of the two countries.

If he has now claimed PoK Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, he has done it because he feels betrayed. He is evenotherwise vulnerable these days because elections are due in four months. If the situation in Kargil or, for that matter, Kashmir does not improve by then, the BJP would be hurt. Many in his party, particularly of the RSS brand, have unsheathed their knives.

They were unhappy when he went to Lahore. The favourable response in India silenced them. But they are back at their games. They would have acted against Vajpayee by this time except for the fact that military operations were not considered an occasion to settle scores.

It is understandable that Islamabad should ask for a meaningful dialogue on Kashmir. This is what it has been seeking for years. But, strangely, it should have fomented trouble when the Prime Minister had practically demolished the anti-Pakistan lobby in India. Vajpayee was really trying hard for a settlement. How must have he felt after he came to know that Islamabad was stealthily sending mercenaries and soldiers for instigating trouble in Kashmir while he was travelling in a bus toPakistan for seeking peace?

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has reportedly given Vajpayee and I.K. Gujral the impression that he was not aware of the army8217;s moves. This is possible to a limited extent. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi too did not know how the then chief of army staff Sundarji had carried out a military exercise in 1988 right up to Pakistan8217;s territory. Rajiv Gandhi made amends when he came to know the truth. It is possible that Sharif was aware of the army8217;s moves.

But he did not know that it would intrude into the Indian territory, as deep as 10 kms and that the intrusion would be on such a large scale, including the crossing of the LoC by the Pakistan troops. But he has made no amends.

Even otherwise, this formulation may not be correct. Sharif, who changed the chief of army staff a few months ago, is not the type of ruler who is oblivious of what is going on in the armed forces. They are the ones who count, he knows. The letter he sent to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan before DefenceMinister George Fernandes gave him and the ISI a clean chit confirms that he was aw-are of what was going on.

The letter alleged: 8220;India8217;s reckless actions along the LoC have created a dangerous situation in the region.8221; Apparently, this did not convince any foreign dignitaries, except the gullible Annan, who proposed the visit of his personal envoy to India and Pakistan, forgetting that the LoC was violated by Islamabad.

The question which has remained unanswered is why Islamabad decided to act. That it wanted to internationalise the problem of Kashmir is nothing new. It has been trying to do so for decades. That Sharif is weak and wanted to distract people8217;s attention from his non-performance does not wash. Pakistan as such has never been an economic miracle. Could he have acted under the armed forces8217; pressure, which no ruler in Pakistan can resist?

Sharif is quite right when he says that the Kashmir problem should be solved across the table. But it can8217;t be done by holding the gun at the sametime. Peace and war cannot go together. How can he expect India to negotiate on Kashmir when it finds Pakistan disturbing the situation, not only by sending infiltrators but also by threatening the Ladakh8217;s line with Kashmir?

Sharif cannot preach restraint without restraining his army, which has initiated the mischief. He has to restore the status quo ante to create the atmosphere for a dialogue. Vajpayee has correctly told him that the onus was on Pakistan to lessen the tension because it was the one who started it. The visit of Pakistan Foreign Minister Sartaj Aziz, possibly under Washington8217;s pressure, should be welcomed. It helps lessen tension because New Delhi and Islamabad will be seen indulging in jaw-jaw, not war-war.

Where do the countries go from here? India8217;s priority is to flush out the infiltrators and Pakistan8217;s to sustain them. What Islamabad has not realised even after three wars is that it cannot take away Kashmir from India by force. It is a political problem. It cannot be sorted out ina battlefield. Were Pakistan to adopt a course of confrontation, it would destroy the subcontinent because both sides have now acquired nuclear capability.

In fact, this is the time when people on both sides must raise their voice against escalation. The contact they have established over the last few years should be deepened and strengthened. True, they will be accused of being unpatriotic if they speak up. But this is the test of their commitment to peace. There is no escape from friendship between the two countries. The bus diplomacy should be given more content, not abandoned.