Intelligence failure a possibility 8212; Lieutenant General

8220;But let8217;s first know the Intelligence system. It has three distinct parts; external intelligence which is the job of the Research and Analysis Wing RAW, internal intelligence which is the job of the Intelligence Bureau IB and tactical intelligence which is the job of the contact troops, the army,8221; he said.

8220;The responsibility of RAW was about 40 per cent, IB another 40 per cent and contact troops about 20 per cent. And not one of them get full marks,8221; he added. The general in the course of discussion, however, said that itwas the job of the external agency to tell them about the developments in Skardu on the other side of the Line of Control.

8220;A better part of the preparations took place in Skardu. There was increased air movement, General Pervez Musharraf, the Pakistani Chief of Army Staff visited it twice, the airstrip was developed, helipads were constructed and more troops inducted here. It was the task of the external agency to tell us about those developments,8221; he said. There was a failure at the command level in intelligence gathering, he conceded but said that compared to the failure of 25 per cent, the success were 75 per cent and focus should not only be on the success but also on further development and deployment.

8220;Going by the one up chain of logic in intelligence failure then it was the task of the government to know nation to nation picture. Everything starts at Delhi,8221; he said, insisting that Pakistan could not be trusted.

But to make up for the intelligence failure due to large gaps in the conflictzone, the army has since deployed more battalions for plugging the gaps as best as possible and enhanced intelligence gathering abilities. 8220;We have deployed surveillance radars but let me make it clear no radar can replace a soldier on the Marpola heights,8221; he added. Meanwhile, post-Kargil, a new training curriculum has been devised for the Army, especially the infantry soldiers. The aim is to toughen the frontline combat soldiers and ensure that the acclimatization problem that arose in Kargil does not reoccur if the infantry is inducted in high altitude areas at short notices again.

Not ruling out the reoccurrence of the Kargil type situation, even if not in Kargil, Lt Gen Prasad said that infantry would have to be battle-ready at all times. 8220;Post-Kargil the training syllabus has undergone a sea change. Soldiers are being trained to survive without food, water and rest even for long durations. The focused point of training curriculum would be on physical fitness and mental robustness,8221; he said.

Aspart of the curriculum, a 40 kilometre march carrying full battle gear, climbing mountain features at increased frequencies and survival tests have been introduced. The focus, no doubt, would be on Kargil type heights, especially when that acclimatization will also come handy for Siachen glacier, he added.

The new training curriculum would include training on advanced weapon systems which have been imported both for counter insurgency operations and for battle situations.