India8217;s Asian ambitions

India8217;s new activism in South-East Asian waters is beginning to invite positive and negative comment around the world. What no one questions is the fact that India has plans to project itself outside its traditional zone. A number of recent developments lend strength to the belief that New Delhi intends to be seen as an Asian power with interests and concerns extending beyond South Asia. No one has failed to notice the largest single hike in defence expenditure in the last Union budget. That reversal of a long trend in defence spending was said to be necessitated by the Kargil war and the need to beef up satellite and aerial surveillance on the Line of Control; the Indian navy8217;s procurement plans also demand substantial additional funds. Among acquisitions which would give the navy the reach it is said to seek are an old Soviet aircraft carrier being massively overhauled, refitted submarines and new ships inducted into the fleets.

India8217;s intentions can also be teased out from two other moves. The 25th anniversary of the fall of Saigon may be one of the reasons that took Defence Minister George Fernandes to Vietnam in March. The other reason was surely the reaffirmation of an old friendship which India would like to invest in more deeply. There are trade and economic opportunities of course. More especially, Vietnam is one of the key nations in new Asian security arrangements taking shape in advance of America8217;s likely partial withdrawal from Asia and China8217;s rise as the predominant military, and over the next decades, possibly, economic power in Asia. One outcome of Fernandes8217; visit is joint India-Vietnam jungle warfare and naval exercises starting soon.

India has also been quick to respond to Japan8217;s initiative to start joint Asian coast guard patrols to combat piracy in Asian waters. Several Asian nations including Vietnam are understandably enthusiastic about the Japanese proposals. China was invited but has not shown any interest as yet. The shipping lanes most menaced by pirates are in the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea. It would not be far wrong to assume that multi-nation coast guard patrols could in time develop a more direct role in managing disputes between China and several other nations over ownership of the Spratley islands and potentially oil-rich shoals in the South China Sea.

To some, India8217;s deepening involvement in Asian regional security arrangements interpreted as a transparent bid which has Washington8217;s blessings to counter Chinese military power in the region spells trouble. India-China rivalry, it is argued, is bad news for both countries, could spill over into their neighbourhoods and could affect sea-lanes and international trade and commerce. In this view India has nothing to gain by lending itself to western balance of power games in Asia and everything to gain from a constructive relationship with China. The counter position is that the only language China understands is the language of realpolitik, that India must recognise and benefit from new regional alignments centred on Japan and that while partnership with China is an ideal well worth aiming for, India must also be prepared for a less happy outcome. Ultimately, it may just be a blue water fantasy.