In the deep freeze

For many Indians today Siachen is a quixotic contest that occasionally garners world records like the highest battlefield ever or the highest helicopter landing. But for Pakistan, especially the army, the humiliation of Siachen manifests itself in many ways. In the popular lexicon, Siachen is synonymous with Indian perfidy, a violation of the Shimla Accord that says that 8220;neither side shall unilaterally alter the situation8221;, with regard to 8220;any of the problems between the two countries8221;. For Pakistan, Kargil was a justifiable response to Siachen. The Kargil operation was suggested in 1987 by Pakistani army chief, General Mirza Aslam Beg, to counter India8217;s occupation of Siachen. General Musharraf himself has justified the intrusions in Kargil by pointing to Siachen.

Within the Pakistani army Siachen resonates as a military setback; the Indians dominate them on the Saltoro, something the Pakistan army has long hidden from its people. Pakistan8217;s refusal to sign maps authenticating its positions has led to the breakdown of all previous talks. Pakistan insists on terming it 8220;the Siachen dispute8221;, although the glacier itself cannot be seen, even from forward Pakistani positions; India holds the Saltoro Ridge, which shuts Pakistan off from Siachen. New Delhi officially talks about a pullback from the Saltoro. Conveniently, however, for Pakistan, Siachen remains the name embedded in the public consciousness.

Most strategic thinkers agree that Siachen has little strategic value. To cite strategic or military arguments for holding on to Siachen is to suggest that an army can charge down a treacherous, icy path that a single man has trouble negotiating. The army commander who first sent troops to the glacier, Lt Gen M.L. Chhibber, himself believes there is no long-term benefit in keeping a permanent presence there. But Siachen can no longer be evaluated purely in military-strategic terms: it is a symbol, an icon. For India it is a symbol of will and a successful feat of arms; for Pakistan it is a debacle, something to be wiped off the slate. For India, Siachen is a drain in terms of money and sheer military effort; In Pakistan, it is a psychological drain on national honour and pride.

Pakistan, therefore, will be pushing hard for a pullback in talks in Islamabad next week. In the ongoing euphoria of peace, there are suggestions in India that a Siachen pullback will give a boost to the Kashmir dialogue. The only thing that could prevent a pullback, this reasoning suggests, is political spinelessness, within India or within Pakistan, of the kind that led to the failure of talks in 1989 and 1992. The discourse, apparently, is no longer about what India could gain from pulling back troops from the glacier. With the mood one of concessions, that would seem a petty irrelevance. The only question now is whether the political establishments will stand in the way of peace.

India tends to undervalue its Siachen advantage; this must be evaluated through Pakistani eyes. An Indian pullback from Siachen will allow President Musharraf to present his people with what will be played up as a triumph. Such a concession 8212; despite the undoubted savings in lives and material 8212; cannot be granted just to boost the peace process. The enormous cost paid by India to gain the advantage in Siachen must translate into benefits elsewhere on the Line of Control or against militant groups based in Pakistan. Since the 1999 Kargil conflict, an entire Indian division now mans the LoC in Kargil occupying areas that are almost as inhospitable as Siachen. A pullback from Siachen must be extended to a corresponding pullback from Kargil.

There are indications that in the talks in Islamabad, India and Pakistan could agree on a face-saving way to authenticate their ground positions in Siachen. In 1992, Pakistan had suggested recording the positions on an annexure that would be attached with the agreement; this proposal is expected to be revived. Pakistan is also expected to provide guarantees that there will be no reoccupation of Saltoro once demilitarisation is completed.

Authentication cannot be bypassed, no matter how inconvenient it is to Pakistan. Without that Pakistan will be free to occupy what are now dominating Indian positions. Vacating the Saltoro Range is pregnant with finality: leaving is easy, returning well-nigh impossible. In Kargil India could prove it was retaliating to the occupation of its own territory: maps signed in 1972 by a Pakistani commander identified it as such. In Kargil, Indian lives were bartered to win back Indian territory. In Siachen, the climate, the altitude and the logistical difficulties mean that territory lost is lost forever. This point has been forcefully conveyed by the Indian army to its government.

Also to be tackled is the basic question that led to the Siachen dispute: what will be the border here after the soldiers pull back from the positions they hold? Can India and Pakistan live with the uncertainty of an unsettled border and an unoccupied no-man8217;s land until a final settlement of the J038;K dispute? Are the two countries going to cooperate in allowing mountaineers on to peaks that only soldiers have assaulted. Will India and Pakistan work together to clean up the garbage accumulated by two armies during two decades? Can the empty spaces of Siachen provide a model of cooperation and co-ownership that could later be applied to the Kashmir valley? A tantalising thought!

For now, India is sending out an ambiguous message. Going into talks on Siachen, Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee has authorised a sharp increase in the extreme cold combat clothing that the army wears in Siachen. We are talking, signals the minister, but we8217;re keeping our powder dry.