General146;s win as per script, but nobody in the audience is fooled

Before the referendum, General Musharraf presented himself as a military leader with a difference. He claimed to have no political ambition, insisted that he only told the truth, and maintained that he held the moral high ground. Once the referendum campaign got under way, all those claims were shredded to bits. The general and his officials resorted to more than a few terminological inexactitudes otherwise known as lies during the course of the campaign. And the moral high ground was lost as state resources were squandered and rules were changed every day to enable a high voter turnout, as well as the illusion of massive popular support for the referendum.

General Musharraf8217;s resort to Islamic symbolism, and his hard-line statements against India, during the referendum campaign made it clear that he was not averse to using different languages for domestic and international consumption. Until recently, the United States looked upon him as the ally who would reverse Pakistan8217;s involvement with militant Islamic ideology in addition to making peace with India. But General Musharraf has proven that he cannot or does not want to break from the tradition of Pakistani military leaders to garner support on the basis of Islamic and anti-India sentiment.

Pakistan8217;s Election Commission has never conducted a poll without electoral lists or uniform requirements for voter identification. But for the referendum, no voters8217; lists were required and anyone claiming to be 18 years of age could vote even without a national identity card. In the absence of polling agents or poll watchers, electoral malpractice was not even an issue. The Election Commission lost one its nobler members Justice Tariq Mahmood as soon as the referendum campaign began. The remaining members seemed far to willing to oblige the government in its desire to maximise the voter turnout and ensure that the outcome was a resounding 8216;yes8217; vote. The undermining of the Election Commission8217;s independence, as well as that of the Supreme Court which has never ruled against a military ruler, contributes to public cynicism about the prospect of Pakistan8217;s return to democracy.

Having no competition on the ballot paper was obviously not enough for General Musharraf, who also tried to create the illusion of an election campaign through orchestrated political rallies. Media coverage of these rallies was marred by phrases such as 8216;8216;rent-a-crowd8217;8217;, 8216;8216;commandeering of public transport8217;8217; and 8216;8216;forced participation by school teachers, government servants, local council employees and industrial workers8217;8217;. Before he opted to transform his image into that of a 8216;8216;man of the people8217;8217;, the general was assumed by many people around the world as having lots of supporters around Pakistan. But the high-handed antics of his team in organising his rallies have created new pockets of antagonism towards the government. No one likes their vehicles taken away forcibly nor is forced participation in a rally the way to win friends and influence people.

During the course of their 8216;8216;campaign8217;8217;, General Musharraf8217;s key associates and spokesmen antagonised the media by constantly attacking it. The Punjab Governor8217;s lashing out at journalists in Faisalabad, backed by a police baton-charge and General Musharraf8217;s personal reposing of confidence in him, has effectively ended the harmonious relations between the present government and the media. General Musharraf has allowed a free press so far, partly because it acts as a safety valve for populist sentiment. But the referendum campaign tested the limits of the military regime8217;s patience with the media.

During the campaign, General Musharraf accepted the support of anyone and everyone who was willing to offer it. Sharing the political stage with political opportunists and individuals facing corruption charges takes away the gloss from the general8217;s reformist image. The decision to befriend the Muttahida Qaumi Movement MQM, which has been accused of terrorism and treason by previous military chiefs as well as by General Musharraf, creates even greater ethical doubts.

It seems now that the general has no objection to politicians, however questionable their past conduct, as long as they do not offer a viable national alternative to military rule. That alone can explain why he refuses to compromise with Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, while other scandal-tainted politicians are welcome in his embrace. Ironically, while Sharif and Bhutto retain Pakistani nationality in exile, MQM8217;s Altaf Hussain proudly accepted British citizenship and has called for a new constitution for Pakistan.

The very decision to hold a referendum raises questions about some of the basic premises of General Musharraf8217;s plans for political reform. The case for the military8217;s intervention in Pakistan8217;s political process is often based on the argument that the country8217;s largely illiterate electorate cannot be trusted to make the right choices. General Musharraf insists on disqualifying politicians he considers discredited simply because he does not want their fate to be left to an untrustworthy electorate. But in the referendum, the same electorate was expected to read a somewhat long question and mark 8216;8216;Yes8217;8217; or 8216;8216;No8217;8217; on the ballot paper. Surely, if the electorate is smart enough to make its choice in a referendum, it can be trusted to do the same in a general election. And if illiteracy does not inhibit voters from reading General Musharraf8217;s somewhat verbose question, why should it prevent them for making the right choice between the symbols that Pakistani voters have used for decades to identify politicians and political parties?

General Musharraf8217;s referendum success has deprived him of the sympathy of those Pakistani democrats who expected him to help reform the country8217;s fractured political system. The general is now being seen in the same light as the country8217;s previous military rulers, with inevitable personality differences. This will also create doubts about his reliability as a Western ally in the long-term. Each one of Pakistan8217;s four military rulers has befriended the United States in the hope of securing support in maintaining power at home and balancing India8217;s overwhelming military superiority. General Musharraf appears to be no exception. But in the dangerous post-September 11 world, the US and the west need not just tactical allies but partners sharing their strategic vision. A military ruler, fresh from a referendum victory in the mold of Field Marshal Ayub Khan and General Ziaul Haq, is hardly likely to be seen as that strategic partner.

Husain Haqqani is currently a Visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. He served as adviser to prime ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto and as Pakistan8217;s Ambassador to Sri Lanka