Fuzzy thinking

So where does nuclear defence through deterrence fit in five years after we declared ourselves a nuclear weapon state? The report does not enlighten us about the status of the nuclear deterrent capabilities. The cynic would say that the term 8220;credible8221; has been dropped from the mantra of credible minimum deterrent to bring in greater pragmatism.

The problem is that the confusion does not end here. At one place, the official report of the ministry of defence claims that 8220;Long Range Surface-to-Surface Missile AGNI-II8221; is one of the systems developed that have led to 8220;production8221; in the past five years.

But only two tests, spread over a year, of the 800-km range AGNI-I missile have been claimed, making it unclear whether this type of missile is under production or still being tested. In fact, there is no reference to any ballistic missiles among 46 major R038;D programmes and the projects being pursued over the past year.

It can be argued that a certain degree of ambiguity is part of any strategy, and for a country like ours that, of necessity, must be circumspect8212;and modest8212;about the strategic capabilities and their development, this assumes even greater importance. But it is difficult to understand the absence of any reference by the ministry of defence to the officially announced nuclear doctrine. Even more important, we need to ensure that we do not confuse ourselves by disconnected thinking and official articulation of nuclear doctrine, strategy and capabilities. This is one area where we need the greatest clarity to ensure a national consensus.