
Now that a three-year deadlock has been broken, negotiations on a global treaty banning production of fissile material for nuclear weapons are due to commence at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
An optimistic view is that a non-discriminatory treaty could be wrapped up within three years. A more realistic view is that unless the five weapons powers take effective steps towards disarmament, negotiations are likely to be blocked once again.
That leaves China. As with most things in this field, the Chinese are inscrutable. There have been no public announcements. However, Beijing is said to have given Washington private assurances that it has halted production of fissile material for weapons. This sounds credible because China too has large stockpiles of both plutonium and HEU.
One of the central issues in a Fissile Material Cut-Off Convention, therefore, should be stockpile reduction. Verifiable cutbacks of existing fissile material for weapons over a period of time would be definite progress towards disarmament.
As of today the negotiating mandate is vague with regard to this crucial matter. The G-21 developing countries, including India, have agreed to commence negotiations on a FMCT but have made it clear they would want to see disarmament linkages to the FMCT.
But apart from that broad formulation, there are major differenceswithin the G-21. Non-nuclear weapons powers in the G-21 are talking about stockpile reduction. In the past India has either been reluctant to speak in those terms or has actually opposed stockpile reduction being brought into the ambit of the FMCT.
Even though Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee has declared India ready to negotiate a FMCT, it is not clear whether New Delhi has worked out a position on stockpile reduction. India8217;s representative at the Conference on Disarmament, Savitri Kunnadi, is sticking to generalities when she reiterates India8217;s commitment to a nuclear weapons-free world.
It is understandable in the context of uncertainties in the international environment after the Pokharan-II tests that the government wants to approach non-proliferation issues cautiously. At the same time, it should be aware that its negotiating partners at the CD, and particularly potential allies in the G-21, are looking for some clarity in the Indian stance.
An internationally verifiable fissile cutoff with stockpilereductions prepares the ground for disarmament. India should have no difficulty with that.